Archetypal Metaphysics and the Psyworld

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Abstract

I address Erik Goodwyn's insightful and nuanced critique of my work on the essence of archetypes that have direct bearing on his own investigations of archetypal origins, attractor states, the mind-body problem, and on the question of metaphysics. Goodwyn's work is grounded in scientific naturalism while I offer an onto-phenomenological methodology that is compatible with his own positions. The questions of embodiment, ground, holism, panpsychism, and *esse in anima* are examined in light of offering a preliminary framework for an archetypal metaphysics where I introduce a theory of *psyworld*.

Keywords

I am grateful to Erik Goodwyn (2020b) for his perspicacious critique of my essay on the essence of archetypes (Mills, 2018) and his penetrating analysis that identifies contradictions, gaps, and unaddressed issues I remain silent on in that work. His critique challenges me to further hone my thinking on the philosophical parameters of an archetype in response to his pointed questions and queries in relation to his own contributions on innateness (Goodwyn, 2010), the origins of archetypes as attractor states that are biologically constituted (Goodwyn, 2013), his recent scholarship on the mind-body problem in Jung (Goodwyn, 2019), as well as his sophisticated argument of how an archetype is internally self-directed (Goodwyn, 2020a), what I believe offers a new mesotheory of agentic mediation (Mills, 2020a).

Goodwyn's gracious engagement of my text offers many inquiries and reservations that merit a meticulous response and further elaboration. His main criticism is that I do not engage the conventional discourse on archetypes from the standpoint of neuroscience and biology nor as arising from culture, but rather I stay of the purely experiential level on how an archetype appears in consciousness. He specifically charges that I do not discuss nor take a stand on the question of first principles, or what he refers to as "first substance," and that I refuse to engage any discussion of biological or other factors contributing to the essence and origins of an archetype, what he both admires for my methodology yet also decries is lacking a formal metaphysics. I will address his concerns in turn before offering my own views on the ontology of an archetype that have direct bearing on a metaphysics of mind. What I hope to do is sketch out a preliminary framework for an archetypal metaphysics that introduces the notion of *psyworld*, which may be seen as an intercessor between embodiment and experience.

1   Embodiment

Professor Goodwyn rightfully reminds us that we are enmattered, and the matter of which we are composed of is subject to observation and investigation by the biological sciences. I emphatically agree. We are embodied beings and this is an ontological given, the details of which are arguable, as he notes, just as his recognition that this issue was not the focus of my essay. But we are on the same page. Our embodiment is a necessary condition for an archetype to emerge, but it is not necessarily a sufficient one to explain the complexifications and ontic dynamic organizations inherent in archetypal process and their emergence. Having said that, Goodwyn is interested in knowing what kind of metaphysics of mind is "lurking in the background" behind the appearances I try to delineate as archetypal manifestations. Rightfully so. Before I attempt an adumbrated answer, let me say that the very question can be approached from many vantage points, all with varying benefits, disadvantages, and propositional assumptions that must be clarified. Should we assume the Kantian phenomenal-noumenal dualism Jung often evokes? Could we explain this from the standpoint of some monism, particularly dual-aspect or neutral monism or some variation? What about presentism—only present things exist? I have argued that essence must appear in order for anything to be real, including an archetype. But we may also consider the Heideggerian move that dis-closedness is both revealed and hidden, unveiled yet concealed, uncovered yet occluded. Of course we are thrown into embodiment—the material world, our physical bodies, culture, language,

cosmos, only the modes of Being and minutia of appearances are varied. The metaphysical quibbles are endless.

Goodwyn wants to bring us back to the naturalized question of physicalism and scientific realism. I must admit that early in my career I was concerned about the bane of material reduction (Mills, 2002), but later came to the conclusion that naturalized accounts of mind do not necessarily devolve into a crass positivist framework or misguided scientism based upon how we conceive of matter and energy. I certainly do not ascribe to the notion of immateriality or the existence of entities that have no form or substance, be it only thought or thinking itself, which of course must arise within our embodiment, just as the energetic stratification of matter must inhere or ingress in something in order to manifest, hence be real. And given that the field of physics has adopted the scope and language of metaphysics, and particularly a philosophy of containment *and* concealment (such as dark matter/energy), there is much compatibility, the pragmatics and details of which I do not need to defend here. Before offering a proposed metaphysics (please be patient), let me prepare the ground so that Goodwyn's concerns are addressed more explicitly.

2   Attractor States and Boundaries of Explanation

Goodwyn rightfully accuses me of slipping in a non sequitur when I summarize his thesis that archetypes are attractor states that could be explained through unconscious psychodynamic motivations and constraints without providing a detailed argument or evidence to back up my assertion with plausibility. What I had in mind with regards to the organization and dynamics of attractor states is related to my commentary on his recent article on archetypal origins and the question of agency (Mills, 2020a). In complementing his theory (Goodwyn, 2013), attractor states could be viewed as agentic processes within unconscious schemata or the archetype itself. Let us speculate that the phenomena of attractor states seek out objects to mate with and incorporate into their own internal structure, biological or otherwise. Therefore the complex ongoing self-organization of an archetype as a process system (a) desires and aims toward engaging and absorbing objects via its experiential field; and (b) it may further form defensive organizations against objects of experience, so we may potentially see detractor states that equally repel against objects due to perceived threats that could endanger the integrity of the archetype if the object were incorporated or merged. This desirous-defensive process system also forms a rudimentary pole of opposition in the archetype, which must mirror a much more complex order within Psyche itself as a web of inner con-

traditions reflective of the robust compendium of varieties of oppositions (Mills, 2019b), such as the coincidence of opposites (*coincidentia oppositorum*) and their complexity (*complexio oppositorum*), hence giving rise to complementarity, tensions, conflicts, compensation, and their conjunction (*coniunctio oppositorum*), ultimately leading toward their union through the transcendent function.[1]

Goodwyn asks "how do unconscious desires, defenses, and identifications relate to innate, biologically based mental biases and constraints?" Here he believes to answer this question one needs a metaphysics of mind to make sense of it all, and particularly "how mind relates to matter." I am not disputing his claim, the details of which we may very well leave to others to define, explain, and cavil about, but with a caveat that just because we are embodied does not mean we are nothing but physical processes in the brain informed by evolutionary pressures, as we are complex systems that undergo their own epigenetic achievements and developmental evolutions within their own process of becoming. Where do unconscious desire, defense, and identification comes from?, he asks. I would say it comes from the archetype itself as a self-organized teleological agency; but on a more fundamental level, we could attribute this to drives (*Triebe*) or our embodied existence in which we are thrown, which gives rise to internal organic expansions, such as sentience, biologically based urges, affect, and pulsions seeking objects for satisfaction, assimilation, fusion, and so forth. This is how a drive operates: it has a source, telos, aim, and object with innate, built-in (organic, evolutionary) capacities for impetus, desire (biases), and motivational constraints (defenses, compromise formations, etc.). The more complex the system becomes, the more variation in quantitative and qualitative functions are enacted and observed; but the complex system must also derive from a fundamental constituent or essence that comprises the basic units of mental life. So just as the complexity of psyche emerges from its ontic epigenetic origins, so must an archetype exhibit a core organizational structure or form that participates in this larger developmental process of becoming. This is what I refer to as an unconscious schema.

While professor Goodwyn does an excellent job of highlighting and delineating their material-efficient causality, I am more concerned with the formal-final causal processes of an archetype. To be sure, all causal processes are operative at any given time in an intricate multifaceted system with some features

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1 See David Henderson (2014) who also explores the conundrum of opposites in his apophatic engagement of Jung.

being emphasized over others based on the level and range of their complexity, valence, intensity, and form. This accounts for multiple plains of explanation depending upon what component of a system is being analyzed at any given moment and avoids committing a mereological fallacy where higher architectonic organizations and epiphenomenal features are boiled down to an original substance that strips the archetype of autonomy and freedom, which attractor states should be able to account for in theory.

3   On Ground and Universal Essence

The brute fact of psychic existence is that we find ourselves as given, as being here, as living presence ontologically thrown into a body, a material *and* mental world, family, community, culture, language, and so forth, that which we confront and are confronted with, one purpose of which is to encounter (on ontological/ontic and existential/existentiell levels) and assimilate into our burgeoning psychic realities. This is our constitutional historicity that is part of fundamental ontology, or what I call archaic primacy, and experientially bestowed a priori, the onto-structural conditions in which we find ourselves. This of course is to assume a form of critical or scientific realism: namely, that the physical universe and the human world precedes our individual (particular) existence, which we find ourselves in and alongside the multiplicity of Being. Goodwyn's main concern is that I do not go far enough and address the question of "first substance." He asks us "why psyche might have such universal essences in the first place and what *their* origin is?" These are indeed difficult questions to sustain.

The issue of ground—whether it be foundationalism, coherentism, infinitism, circular (or dialectical) dependence, absolutism, or in the onto-theological/transcendentalist tradition, a ground without a ground (*Ungrund*)—simultaneously engages the question of essence regardless of where we want to locate its ultimate source or discourse. Since the linguistic turn, these debates typically rest on epistemological assumptions and definitional disputes dislocated from their original historical contexts. Depending upon how we define these terms we will get different propositional attitudes, suppositions, and significations. Are there non-repeating finite chains, repeating finite chains, non-repeating infinite chains, repeating infinite chains, infinite finite chains, or finite infinite chains? Is there a beginning and/or end to infinity? If essence must appear in order for anything to be real, then it has to come from somewhere: it does not just pop up *ex nihilo*. Does it come from itself, a prior ontology (even pre-ontological), or from a posterior position in which it arises from

within in its own immediacy? These questions beg the origin of origins, of which we may hopelessly fall into an infinite regress or simply remain agnostic about.

Goodwyn is wanting an answer to the question of ground and its relation to "the concept of physical matter." He himself has discussed the hard problem of neuroscience in addressing these matters with regards to the mind-body problem, so he is well aware of the lure and dangers of physical reduction and how it does not resolve the question of consciousness. Instead, he advocates for a Neoplatonic neutral monism where there is a unitary wholeness to the universe that ontologically exists prior to all particularization (and presumably participation), or parts from which all is derived (Goodwyn, 2019, pp. 80–81). In other words, all entities and appearances arise from a first substance, the wholeness of the cosmos, the *Unus Mundus*, hence a holistic monism, rather than the notion that holism is a developmental achievement that arises out of its earlier constituencies. For Goodwyn, the whole is not derived from parts nor is it merely the sum of its parts: it is the metaphysical ground from whence all arises.

4   Preliminary Considerations toward an Archetypal Metaphysics

In positing the whole before the part, the universal before the particular, the One before the many, we have entered into the domain of speculative metaphysics with a number of potential outcomes and sundry problematics. It is for this reason that I adopt a two-fold approach in order to obviate (and hence avoid answering) these knotty issues: (1) I start with a phenomenological-ontic description of the unfolding of interiority, or what is experienced from the "inside"—which Goodwyn has a problem with—rather than the standpoint of the "outside;" and (2) I development a theoretical paradigm of the archetype as emerging from a developmental monistic ontology. Let me explain.

The methodological position I begin with in my investigation of the essence and appearance of an archetype is what I call *onto-phenomenology* or *internal ontology*. I am interested in tracing the steps of internally derived experience. If an archetype exists, it must have an (a) internal self-structure that (b) materializes in some form, or it would not be actual. I am starting from this perspective. But even if you start with phenomenology, you must have an ontological condition or ground from which the organization and experience of phenomenon comes from, occurs, and appears. This is tied to its earliest (archaic) structural conditions that inform how phenomena manifest regardless of how we define or describe them to be. If emergence or manifestation begins from more simple configurations and then advances in organizational complexity and con-

tent within unique contingencies and contexts in which it finds itself budding, then you have a developmental monism that connects the most primordial, unrefined, and rudimentary (often organic structures) to the more sophisticated evolving shapes over time that further build on its maturational, epigenetic achievements, which it absorbs into its internal configurations as a more robust whole. That is the basic framework, but we could make it very elaborate depending upon where we want to go with it. My basic aim here is to articulate how internally derived agency expresses itself through fractionation as the manifestation of teleology, which is the externalization of its essence: in other words, the *presence of essence*.

Goodwyn ups the ante and says that because I attribute autonomy, agency, and self-directed teleology that are part of an archetype's organizational principles that then self-manifest, I really should not be critical of Jung when he dips into language that seems to attribute "godlike powers" to an archetype. But the difference here is crucial: unlike the concept of God, archetypes are not self-caused. Although they are autopoietic, they are not created *ex nihilo* from omnipotence (or from any omniproperties) or pure thought thinking itself into existence or thinking about its operations of being and becoming. I rather prefer to view archetypes as arising from within their natural parameters, of which Goodwyn would relegate to biological systems operating within the archetype itself. But what I would suggest is that we can have many strata of *explanandum* as we can have many *explanans*. We do not need to collapse origin into its material substratum to make the case that an archetype is much more than that, just as Goodwyn proposes in his own theory that weds biology and culture into its own ontological mosaic.

My use of conventional language such as "within," "interiority," and "externality" is something of a sticking point for Goodwyn (2020b), especially when I question transpersonal (hence supernatural) presuppositions:

> Taking the purely experiential approach presupposes that such things cannot be proven or disproven and so speak entirely of how everything is going on "from within." But within what? Unless we are willing to begin classifying substances as within or without—a maneuver Mills is trying to avoid—the best we can do is to label some experiences as having a quality of *apparent interiority* and others as not having this quality. Those that do not may or may not fall under the categories of transpersonal or even supernatural (whatever that may mean), but without a metaphysics of mind from which they operate, we can neither criticize nor confirm such a framework. Otherwise engaging the concepts and categories here, is only to invite the "messy epistemological burden" and tackle it head on.

In evoking the need to take a stand on a "metaphysics of mind" operating within the qualia of experience, he is suggesting that phenomenology as a method cannot suspend the question of ontology. And I agree with him, as I have said elsewhere (Mills, 2010, 2012). But I do not agree that we cannot criticize certain transpersonal or supernatural frameworks,[2] such as onto-theism, because we may use the same criterion to adjudicate their validity based upon onto-phenomenology. The question becomes, Do they empirically manifest or appear? Just as an archetype must appear in order to be actual, so must Spirit (*Geist*) or God. Spirit or soul emerges in all things that are psychic by virtue of the fact that we are alive and the world is animated with life, while God, which I argue is a human concept of ultimate Ideality as the invention of an idea, *does not* for the simple reason that God has not manifested. Point me to the empirical evidence if I am wrong. Furthermore, an "apparent interiority" is not the same as apparent exteriority, as following Goodwyn's logic, each phenomena should have to justify a material existence. Internality and externality are equiprimordial: they are two dimensions of spacetime yoked together ontically in psyche.

Given that inner and outer are phenomenal experiences within mind transpiring within aspects and magnitudes of worlding, and that division, splitting, bifurcation of otherness, identity and difference are dialectical relations we categorize in thought itself, I do not follow the criticism that we cannot posit these contrary distinctions internally without falling back on some grand metaphysical scheme. On the contrary, this approach can explain internal dynamics without having to offer, let alone figure out, the big picture item of a formal metaphysics of the cosmos. Here the description of an internal phenomenon follows an idealist methodology due to the fact that it is posited in mind, but that does not mean it does not transpire within a naturalistic-realist schematic: both domains are operative at once on parallel levels and are mutually implicative due to their dialectical relations.

In order to avoid solipsism, viz. everything is in my mind—there is no outside, we start from our own immediacy of experience that is internally given or naturally bestowed then work our way outwardly to a standpoint of externalization of interiority. That is what an archetype does: it awakens from its primal

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2 Please note that when I refer to the "transpersonal" I am referring to phenomena that are beyond individualistic experience and expression, such as universals common to social collectives (Mills, 2019a), spirituality or religious instinct being a prime example; but when I refer to "supernatural" I mean a supreme Creator or Being (or entities) that is above or beyond the natural universe in which we find ourselves, not to mention the more pedestrian definitional notions of God enjoyed by the masses, a subject matter I have thoroughly refuted (Mills, 2017).

unity in which it finds itself and externalizes its essence into otherness that it then takes back and reabsorbs into its internal structure on a spiraling developmental stairway toward more richer and hardy shapes of expression. This concentric, coiling, ascending stage progression of an archetype constitutes its dialectical awakening, manifestation, and progression.

Presumably when Goodwyn asks, "within what?," he is not satisfied with a purely experiential approach to archetypal process: he is looking for how the psyche is connected to matter in some manner. And not just any matter, but the ultimate or absolute ground that conditions matter itself. In other words, What is more fundamental? He has already alerted us to his position. Goodwyn (2020b) assumes a top-down monism where "individual psyches are merely local aspects of a much bigger unified substance," such as the implicate order of wholeness that binds us all in our "interconnectedness." As Goodwyn (2020, personal communication) states: "The whole is prior to the part. And thus the most fundamental object is the entire universe, of which everything else is derivative, on down to molecules." There is much to be unpacked in this statement, as it entails having to account for *original first cause*. Here we may observe a revival of ancient natural philosophy where he starts macrocosmically with the whole universe and then microcosmically locates the "real" substance in the atom. In my approach, I do not have to provide my own cosmogony to address the questions of how an archetype manifests while Goodwyn does. He presupposes a physical cosmos in which matter, mind, psyche, and *arché* all emerge out of. Having said this, my position does not necessarily contradict his, as essence must not only appear, it must be connected, at least theoretically, to all other forms of entities (actual or potential) in a monistic universe where everything is interconnected and ontically interdependent, or it could not disperse its essence in the first place let alone intermingle or participate of a shared universe. It is only on the condition that we participate of one cosmos that essence can intermingle with all objects (in thought, proximity, spacetime) or else we would have an infinite sea of plurality with incompatible essences due to their different internal structures, processes, and properties that by definition *could not* intermingle. That is why patterns must be universal in some form even if their contents, contexts, qualities, properties, intensities, and so on vary.

While I focus on the internality of an archetype, Goodwyn believes they are also "external" to the individual psyche or mind, presumably due to cross-cultural symbols, and this would likely align him in some way with Jung's notion of the collective unconscious or objective psyche. But we could claim there are only collective psyches that participate of universal essences even if they derive or come from one source. Regardless, I am starting from "within" and

Goodwyn (2020b) is starting from "without," which is justified within a dual-aspect or neutral monist paragon where everything emanates from and trickles back to "the origin of which is the 'neutral substance'." This is the Neoplatonic pole of his thinking that in many ways attempts to account for first cause, first substance, and the overarching paradigm that, if I am reading him correctly, posits a cosmic emanationist philosophy of transpersonal supervenience reminiscent of panpsychism. Here psyche (he refers to them as individual egos) emerges from our generic "impersonal substrata" that is the universal a priori condition for mind to materialize. Whether we situate these ideas and aporias in the history of substance philosophy, Ideal Forms, panpsychism, contemporary mind studies, and/or theoretical physics that promise a unified concept of mind and nature, I will leave that for him to resolve. Current trends in Jung studies have been keen to explore the relationship between participation and transpersonal psychology (Brown, 2020) and have even linked the psyche with singularity and holographic string theory where, taken from Jung's (1952) equation relating psychic energy to mass: "Psyche = highest intensity in the smallest space" (p. 45), the ultimate archetype of unity (symbolized by the mandala) unites cosmos and psyche in a singular underlying structure (Desmond, 2018). Whether or not Goodwyn privileges metaphysics over onto-phenomenology, mystical moments of unitive experience may be said to comport well within a monistic ontology.

I think professor Goodwyn has more cut out for himself to prove than I do by simply adopting an onto-phenomenal praxis because its stays experientially-near rather than experientially-far. In other words, remaining within a theoretical model that describes and explicates the process of immediate experiential mediacy and the dialectical unfolding of internal ontology has less burden than accounting for, let alone proving, the existence of a mind independent universe from which all is said to derive from and that *is itself psychic*, not to mention how that is possible. He has already committed to privileging ontological realism that conditions all other forms of substance to derive from and manifest, including the psyche or mind itself, but he also makes psyche derivative of a cosmic panpsychic process that supervenes on all particularities that populate the universe, which I believe is a logical corollary to his proposition. Can we further lend credibility to this thesis?

5   On Holism

All of this engages the question of holism. Goodwyn takes my remarks on the transcendent function and pursuit of wholeness (Mills, 2018, p. 210) as

being "either an infantile desire or an imaginary concept" when he is invested, understandably so, in seeing how everything fits within the whole as a unified monism. Recent scholarship in holism and its problematics have addressed this question, along with its limitations, in depth (McMillan, Main, & Henderson, 2020; Main, Henderson, & McMillan, 2020). For the record, I do not see how holism neatly fits within a unified metaphysics despite my training in process philosophy except from the standpoint of abstract theory, logic, or mystical encounters of lived reality. It clearly is not possible from a psychological vantage point as we can never be complete or totally unified in our being, as this would mark the end of desire. Name me one human being who does not lack? The pursuit of wholeness is an infinite striving to fulfill oneself, to achieve ideality, to broach completion, such as the individuation process affords, hence to end the lack; but this is only possible, if at all (if we are lucky, and only as an emotional attitude), when we perish: the striving itself, therefore, is a necessary transcendental illusion that brings qualitative zest to life. This does not devalue the impetus and felt-need for wholeness, only that we must realize the delimitations of such a grandiloquent quest. The most we can hope for is that we gain increasing approximations to this mode of ideal value. The transcendent function as process offers no guarantees that opposition will ever be unified or fully sublated, only engaged, wrestled with, and savored for its own value. Here we must concede that the phenomenal felt-attitude can be entirely different from its ontological attainment.

Goodwyn (2020b) wants me to take a stand on my "underlying metaphysical assumptions about the nature of what psyche actually is," that is, "what sort of substance psyche is or not … You have to take a position on what sort of thing psyche *is* first and justify it before you can then subsequently explain why such things are unreal, incoherent, or implausible. Mills only does half the work needed here to make such claims." We can try to bracket this demand through onto-phenomenology, as I have tried to do, but he is ultimately correct: we can never elude metaphysics because it "always has a way of coming back to bite us in the ass" (Mills, 2020b, p. 195). More on this in a moment.

6   Psyworld

I have attempted to argue that an archetype must externalize itself in nature (including the material-energetic world of mind-brain dependence) in order for it to be made actual (Mills, 2018), but nature (the physical universe) may very well be the original condition from which it derives and emerges, hence making the distinction only important based on first principles, namely, origi-

nal ground (*ab origine*). An onto-phenomenological scheme allows us to enter the dialectical circle anywhere in the system and still be connected to the whole, but from a particular perspective as ontological relativity within the multiplicities of Being. This methodology has its own problems, which I will not pretend to resolve here. Although the universe is there for consciousness, and we find ourselves in it, of which psyche is a part of, its relation to an endless holism all the way to infinity is not something I can defend in the scope of this project. I look forward to further discussions with professor Goodwyn on this enjoyable topic where we largely share a simpatico in intellectual interest and fellowship, but I would like to end with some preliminary speculations on first principles of which we are both preoccupied with.

Roger Brooke (2015, cf. p. 80) has made the claim, following in both an epistemological and phenomenological tradition via Jung, that "we are in psyche," not that "psyche is in us." As he puts it elsewhere, "the psyche is the world in which we live and find ourselves. It is not inside us; we are inside it" (Brooke, 2009, p. 604). Here he is amplifying on Jung (1957, p. 271) who says that psyche *surrounds* us, and is not merely in us, as our encounter with life includes all of worldhood. Jung also extends this to the collective unconscious that "surrounds us on all sides," and like psyche is "an atmosphere in which we live" (Jung, 1946, p. 433). Being within, surrounded by, and in an atmosphere spatializes the psyche as an encompassing principle of presence that, like the concept of world, follows a philosophy of containment. Here the notion of a whole is implicit and presupposed when we postulate an outside that contains all within. The locus is a shift from the inner to the outer that conditions the inner, but at the same time is indistinguishable from its point(s) of origin.

Brooke goes to great length to differentiate the psyche from the mind, as he abhors the reductive language of reification and any philosophical implications that separates mind from world, which he sees as a post-renaissance creation. For Brooke (2009), following Husserl and his pupil Martin Heidegger, psyche is the lifeworld (*Lebenswelt*): "The world is thus the place of psychological life ... the landscape of my psychic life" (p. 603). In other words, the world is for me as I am immersed in my thrownness into the (a) symbolic, hence the archetypal, language and narrative, culture, (b) history and cosmos; and (c) into a *psychology of place*, hence my environment, my body, things, objects of perception, which are ready at hand, and so forth mediated through discourse (*logos*) and spatiotemporal relations as our being in the world.

Let us take this up for a moment that Psyche surrounds us, is an atmosphere in which we are embedded and live, and we are in worldhood rather than it being in us, like our brains. But we can go further than this: *we are psyche*. Let's call this *psyworld*, a symbiosis between embodiment and expe-

rience. The psyworld is that which we are, at once given or thrown, in the sense that we must encounter and grasp the situation or facticity in which we find ourselves, *before* any moment of self-reflection or analysis, that is, before an observing conscious ego develops simply because we are *inside* the situation—materially, environmentally, culturally; and every developmental experience the self has with the world thereafter that has been incorporated, modified, memorialized, and laid down mnemonically within the interiors and contours of its unconscious abyss. The reason why psyworld is given is that we are in it already as being-in-experience—its original state or condition, as life that desires within us. This original *that* or *something* that bears itself before us is identical to what presents itself to us as who we are in such immediacy. The moment self-reflexivity occurs, the minute an observing ego-consciousness or self-consciousness is introduced, the ego breaches the immediacy of its naked thereness, its original being—the *thisness* of psyche, its primal unconscious ontology. When self-reflection ensues we move from direct emersion in our primordiality to an objectification of the plurality of things which we are part of yet remain and occur within our original being. As such, it is the reality within us.³ Psyworld is therefore everything we find ourselves in and experience throughout life informed by all presences and intensities it encounters, both in terms of its embodied physical existence, the materiality of the natural world, and the social relations in which it is embedded.

This attitude adopts realism as an ontological prior, which logically precedes the individual subject by virtue of the fact that we are born into a preexisting material and environmental reality. But this does not negate idealistic currents inherent in a naturalized attitude; rather, both processes are co-occurrences operating simultaneously. This position takes a stand on what is primary and what ontological conditions exist prior to our own personal existence. The question of whether psyche comes *before* the human being vis-à-vis the collective unconscious is another matter. Furthermore, the question of whether psyche participates of a universal panpsychism I will suspend: I am not prepared to make that commitment without having investigated the matter in depth. But all these conditions would still assume a naturalized form of existence, perhaps even transpersonal or transcendental (however that is defined) that prefaces each of our psychological lives, which clearly emphasizes a concrete world of objects and processes prior to human consciousness. But psyworld is more than just the material world alone: it is its own bracing and restoring cosmos. When

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3   Cf. Jung (1927): "For it is the function of consciousness not only to recognize and assimilate the external world through the gateway of the senses, but to translate into visible reality the world within us" (*cw*, 8 § 342).

one gets tired of physics, one finds "meta," something beyond or *more than* just the antiseptic universe of physical objects. Here psyche is *lifesoul* that enlivens its own world, one that surrounds us in its own atmosphere of vitality and containment.

Regardless of what position we take on these matters, these distinctions and qualifications continue to dog metaphysics by vexing questions introduced by the epistemological turn. How do we know the world exists without psyche? How do we know world is merely what we experience? How do we know anything is whole or contained under a unification principle? What does whole mean? Non-division, non-difference? Difference within totality? Then how can anything be unified, let alone singular or one? If it is everything, then how do we know a world exists at all when it could merely be psyche that exists and the universe (us included) is its product and manifestation? If the universe is psychic, how could non-organic life have consciousness, especially since the concept of consciousness is a modern invention? How about an executive agency or central control station running the railroad? These questions naturally address Goodwyn's concerns as well. But unlike Goodwyn and Brooke, I am interested in internal spacings, largely derived from or modified by unconscious factors, and this is more of a categorical distinction or feature of interiority belonging to onto-phenomenal processes or internal ontology than it is on the big ticket item of, What comes first, chicken or egg? Regardless of what causal antecedents we may attribute to ultimate genesis, inner and outer, within and without, internal and external are equiprimordial. In other words, they are inseparable and mutually implicative because they are dynamic dialectical relations that cannot exist without the other. We experience these diversities and demarcations phenomenologically within different modes of being and awareness. Just as we have various ontic and existentiell relations to people and place, we also filter and experience them internally through various intuited, perceived, or felt boundaries of distinction, separation, and occasion. To assume no boundaries between inner and outer, undifferentiated unity or holism, complete totality or wholeness, then Oneness is merely a phenomenological or mystical encounter, which is not the same as a metaphysical singularity.

7   *Esse in Anima*

There are very scant references by Jung to *esse in anima*. He first refers to the term in *Psychological Types*, and his entire discussion takes place in the context of the question of the existence of God. Although customarily translated

as "being in the soul," we may wish to highlight the verb "to *be* in soul." For Jung (1921), to be in soul was given: "The *esse in anima*, then, is a psychological fact, and the only thing that needs ascertaining is whether it occurs but once, often, or universally in human psychology" (*cw*, 6, § 67). *Esse in anima* is introduced as a "third, mediating standpoint" (*cw*, 6, § 77) between mind (*nous*) or intellect (*intellectu*) and material reality or things (*re*) united in and through psyche as a fusion of opposite substances (material, immaterial, or otherwise). Here *esse in anima* has the same meaning as the "human psyche," which Jung employs interchangeably in this early book, only then to abandon its usage altogether. Instead, he adopts the conventional term "psychic reality" that was then later recast under the guise of the psychoid.

Jung, over and over years, emphasizes the "autonomous activity of the psyche" as a "vital process, a continually creative act" (*cw*, 6, § 78). Soul has vitality and creates as it acts. This leads Jung to claim: "The psyche creates reality everyday" (*cw*, 6, § 78). But what does he mean by that? The answer is not surprising but it is important. Here Jung is not adopting a pure idealism where the soul thinks its existence into being nor the material reality of the external world, but rather reality is created via "*fantasy*" (*cw*, 6, § 78). In other words, fantasy is its own reality. Fantasy becomes the "bridge" between subject and object, where "inner and outer worlds are joined together in living union" (*cw*, 6, § 78) mediated through unconscious process. Here Jung adopts a particular position that was well embraced by German Idealism: imagination mediates between intuition (perception of objects) and thought (ideas). And for Hegel (1830), "phantasy is reason" (§ 457). *Geist*—meaning both "spirit" and "mind"—and nature are united: the subject-object divide is closed. For Jung, soul is an aperture that provides a porthole to consciousness *and* heaven through the powers of imagination.

Scholarly engagement of the concept of *esse in anima* is esoteric and largely related to commentary on the autonomy of the psyche following a generative principle (Novac, 2013), as a solution to the problem of the Cartesian split (Colman, 2017), Jung's foundationalist epistemology (Brooks, 2011), on the question of grounding psychic experience (McMillan, 2016), and the realm of the psychoid (Bishop, 2000; Brooks, 2011; Huskinson, 2003; Mills, 2014a). Christian McMillan (2018) has analyzed the inherent vitalism in Jung's notion of soul as "an 'opening' to an enchanted sensation" (p. 195), but further alerts us to the problem of Jung's fluidity and blurring of boundaries. Steve Myers (2019) has emphasized how *esse in anima* co-creates the world we experience as a matrix of interactions between our perceptual apparatus and the external environment mediated through an implicit unconscious epistemology. Robin McCoy Brooks (2011) has further interpreted Jung's concept of *esse in anima* as signi-

fying the notion that "being resides in the soul" (p. 498). For Jung, the psyche provides "its living value" (*cw*, 6, § 77): it confers its own being. "What indeed is reality if it is not a reality in ourselves, an *esse in anima*?" (*cw*, 6, § 77). Here existence has a surplus of value: psyche is "living being" (Jung, 1926; *cw*, 8, § 605).

What does it mean for being to reside in soul? Would this not make the unconscious the house of Being?[4] What is reality if it is granted as life within? Is this not tantamount to an unconscious phenomenology or does it signify more? How do these ideas correlate with my notion of psyworld? Keeping in mind the problem of boundaries of the psyche, I wish to exploratorily offer six propositional attitudes from the standpoint of onto-phenomenology:

1:   *Psyche is existence.*
     Psyche is real, that which *is*, that which is the case. We *are* psyche—living reality: it is our facticity. We fall into psyche and awaken as psyche strikes into existence. Psyworld is there, standing before itself, as offering, as inner being, self-presence.

2:   *Psyche is experience.*
     Psyche experiences and is experiencing. We are experience: we experience ourselves, experience world, and have experience of experiencing. Psyworld is source point: pure experience, pure process, continuous flow, unrest. Nothing is outside of psychic experience, as outside is an internal posit. All boundaries are psychic boundaries: created, demolished, erased. Psyworld is its own fashioning.

3:   *Psyche creates world.*
     Psyche exists and world is its product and manifestation. Worldhood is conceived in psyche. Psyche awakens as desire and sentience and knows itself as self-certainty, its intuited and felt interiority, which it superimposes on all events it encounters, both within and outside the boundaries it forges within itself. Because psyworld encounters itself as already being *in* experience, it apprehends the manifold of existence as a creative and fluid act, uniquely filtered through its internal naturalized subjectivity. Psyche is therefore generative and procreative. Reality is constructed and reconstructed by mind.

4:   *Psyche is not in the world, but rather world is in psyche.*
     Psyche is world. World is already bracketed *in*. Psyworld contains the full plurality of reality. We can never get outside of psyche, only posit divisions, fissures, distinctions, and difference within identity. Objectification

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4   Although I make this point in *Origins* (Mills, 2010, p. 66), in my analysis of Heidegger's project of fundamental ontology, I make the argument that the unconscious is the house of Being rather than language (Cf. Mills, 2014b, p. 289).

is merely a partitioning off and reorganization of what it apprehends as world, one that presents itself to itself as living reality, being-in-soul.

5:   The world is psyche.
        We are born inside world and generate world: psyworld is interiorized and interiorizing. World is presented *to* and is presented *in* psyche as presence. Psyworld is self-presencing. Psyche imbues world with its essence. Psyworld is an expanse of *spacings* and temporal dispersal of interiority. Reality is therefore psychic, the mediation and encircling of world.

6:   Psyche is world.
        We are world; world is us. World is enveloped within psyche. Psyche encompasses and encloses the whole of world and everything it experiences. Psyworld is in itself and from itself, as Being-in-and-for-itself. Psyche is psyworld. Psyworld is its own universe.

8   Coda

We have determined that *esse in anima* as being *in* psyche is ontologically determined yet determinate as its own psyworld, which may be viewed as a border concept bridging and integrating natural embodiment and the encompassing experiential lifeworld it encounters as a synthetic existential unit. We are a psyworld of our own making yet already endowed as its own existence disclosed as being-in-experience. Psyche encounters world as a totality, first from its most inchoate or nascent condition of simple unity it finds itself ensconced, to the breach into plurality and multiplicities of entities and environs it differentiates itself from, which populate world. Here psyworld breaks out of its indivisible immediate being it finds itself submerged and engrossed as archetypal embryo only then to generate a manifold world of different objects by the spatiotemporal act of splitting up unity into particularization and plurality. Emersion in immediate unity leads to dispersal, which leads to a regathering of its essence conjoined in a much greater totality of inclusion as a culminating wholeness in thought and being. Whether this extends to Being itself remains a mystery.

Just as we have articulated the essence and internal ontology of an archetype, this paradigmatic structural and patterned activity must apply to the psyche itself as a developmental, epigenetic, architectonic monistic process of becoming. In other words, essence must permeate every aspect of psychic reality in order to participate of a greater holistic process. Whether psyche returns to a *higher unity* throughout its developmental maturation toward the pursuit of wholeness requires more study. These preliminary conclusions based on speculative metaphysics may lead to more applications and justifications

from other disciplines interested in abductive and empirical demonstration. Whether psyche is the foundation of everything, where the whole is Psyworld, and that everything else is merely a variation and extraction of cosmic Mind, is left unanswered.

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