Contemporary Psychoanalysis and Critical Theory: A New Synthesis

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ABSTRACT

Critical Theory and contemporary psychoanalytic perspectives share many compatibilities in offering a constructive critique of society. Psychoanalysis teaches us that whatever values and ideals societies adopt, they are always mediated through unconscious psychic processes that condition the collective in both positive and negative ways, and in terms of relations of recognition and patterns of social justice. Contemporary critical theory may benefit from engaging post-classical and current trends in psychoanalytic thought that have direct bearing on the ways we conceive of and observe how individuals operate within social collectives. In particular, Axel Honneth relies on psychoanalytic sources that are dated. Critical theory would profit from engaging post-object relations schools such as self psychology, analytical psychology, psychoanalytic intersubjectivity theory, relationality, and contemporary attachment theory that are more nuanced yet can supplement Winnicottian perspectives. Implications for contemporary theory need to reflect upon how the psychosocial matrix of self and society both facilitate and hinder optimal social arrangements and fabrics of justice as it takes up the question of normativity. It is within this context that I hope to introduce contemporary psychoanalytic paradigms that move beyond classical models yet complement redirecting shifts in emphasis both psychoanalysis and Critical Theory attempt to accomplish. I suggest that an applied psychoanalytic explication on social phenomenology can expand the interpretive depth and breadth of human relations and open up a permissible space for interdisciplinary discourse. Here new vistas emerge for a proposed synthesis between the two schools of thought.

Axel Honneth's recent turn to psychoanalysis to bolster Critical Theory has promising potential to augment interdisciplinary studies on a critical theory of society. Setting aside disputes on theoretical incompatibilities between the two disciplines, such as those that revolve around rival conceptions of the nature of human aggression that challenge the ubiquity of prosocial behaviour, the role of the negative, the question of a morality of reason (*Vernunftmoral*), and the rejection of an innate principle of destruction attributed to a death drive (*Todestrieb*), Honneth seeks to "make a critical theory of

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society dependent upon psychoanalysis (in the broadest sense of the term)" .[1] It is important for the discipline of critical theory to understand that there are many forms of contemporary psychoanalytic thought that are already in simpatico with their overall project. In this essay I hope to show that modes of compatibility already exist, and that by engaging contemporary psychoanalytic perspectives, critical theory may further prosper.

Honneth's desire to supplement a moral psychology guided by psychoanalytic insights can only advance the field. Here he embraces an essential tenet of the primacy of unconscious processes operative in all individuals and on every conceivable strata of social collectives:

> At a very fundamental level, we should expect that within the social world, there will be affects and motives that are inaccessible to consciousness. In order to be able to take account of the opaque, unconscious motives expressed in anxiety, longings for attachment, desires for togetherness and fantasies of submission, we need a psychological theory of the subject, a theory of socialization that takes sufficient account of the genesis of unconscious affects in our individual biographies. I do not yet see any other theory better suited to this demand than some version of psychoanalysis.[2]

He continues to ask, what of the many varieties of psychoanalysis best serve this purpose? He stipulates that the most suitable theory must take into account the "socialization milieu of society as a whole",[3] and this would be the best candidate to adopt. He concludes that "object relations theory" best fits this criterion.

But psychoanalysis has come a long way since Freud and the early object relations theorists came onto the scene. In fact, we can say that all of psychoanalytic theory has been subsumed in new paradigms that have built on these foundational ideas, the details of which I will outline in what follows. Honneth favours Winnicott's work, yet there have been many notable contributions in psychoanalysis since his time that have paved the way for new developments and redirections in clinical and applied theory as well as cultural critique. In fact, it could be argued, that Critical Theory is behind the times, notwithstanding Winnicott's timeless influence. It is understandable why objects relations, which is really about people relations, is an attractive supplement to Critical Theory, because it shows that Self-in-relation-to-Society involves ontologically inseparable processes. Individual development transpires within a relational and psycho-socio-symbolic order that is given as part of our facticity or thrownness into an intersubjective matrix of socialization and the structuralizations of culture. But contemporary psychoanalytic paradigms offer many more nuanced approaches to conceiving personal and social development than those present in Winnicott's pioneering work, and Critical Theory may find these equally attractive, compelling, and compatible with its overall project.

Although Honneth suggests that object relations theory "might represent a danger to Critical Theory, robbing it of the psychoanalytical impulse of negativity",[4] this is hardly the case. In reality, object relations perspectives are not in conflict with classical psychoanalysis given that Freud advanced both the object relations and ego psychology movements, only that it is a matter of *emphasis* in any psychoanalytic paragon on human nature and social relations to highlight certain psychological dynamics over others. One does not have to emphasize an either/or scenario or bifurcation between society and the individual and ask us to choose which model or causal force is more correct or operative, as we can plainly see a confluence of psychoanalytic observations at play in all

aspects of social reality, personality formation, and subjective analysis both inside and outside of the consulting room with palpable empirical correlates. Whether we claim human aggression and destruction is the result of endogenous propensities or the internalization of the negative affective effects of socialization, it really becomes an irrelevant quibble.

What matters is how negativity manifests and corrodes harmonious social relations that both critical theory and psychoanalysis are concerned about ameliorating. Although I believe Honneth's tendency to jettison drive theory[5] is misguided based upon the empirical fact that we are embodied and have internally derived desires, conflicts, and pulsions to contend with, this does not mean that we should not explore points of connection and consilience where both psychoanalysis and critical theory become intimate partners in attempting to better society. It is here that Honneth has rejuvenated the notion of recognition as integral to understanding the social dynamics of intersubjectivity and hence recasts an ethical vision for humanity. It is within this context that I hope to introduce contemporary psychoanalytic paradigms that move beyond classical models yet compliment redirecting shifts in emphasis that both psychoanalysis and critical theory attempt to accomplish.

From Classical Theory to Object Relations

Despite the fact that recognition theory was arguably introduced by Hegel, the notion of recognition and intersubjectivity have become popular concepts in psychoanalysis originating from early object relations theorists onward. The object relations movement was paved by Freud when he introduced the notion that the aim (*Zeil*) of a drive (*Trieb*) is to seek satisfaction through an object (*Objekt*), which Freud mainly considered to be other people and their functions.[6] Although an object is the "most variable" of all instinctual activity, that is, unconsciously motivated, he ultimately privileges human connection and our need for relatedness with others in order to fulfill our desires, which brings us satisfaction. In fact, the social dimension to Freud's classical theory is made most explicit when he discusses the need for "primary relatedness" through the process of "identification", which is "the earliest expression of an emotional tie with another person".[7] An emotional connection is an important ingredient of identification because we simply don't identify with just anyone, as attachment research affirms. There is a selective aspect to identification, and we can see it operating quite unpretentiously during childhood when a child takes his or her parents as an ideal, and wants to possess them and/or be like them, often displayed through bonds of affection and play. Freud goes on to say that it is "a very important form of attachment to someone else, probably the very first, and not the same thing as the choice of an object".[8] And Freud specifically concedes that for each gender the mother becomes the original and most important model of identification,[9] which is "established unalterably for a whole lifetime as the first and strongest love-object and as the prototype of all later love-relations – for both sexes".[10] Here Freud clearly states that "love has its origin in attachment"[11] beginning with the appropriation of the mother's body. From these passages, Freud is clearly describing an intrapsychic process of incorporating the attributes and qualities of another subject (in German, *Person*) encountered through ongoing intersubjective, relational exchange.

Although there may be a categorical distinction between interpersonal relations (i.e. based in selectivity, affectivity, qualitative engagement, and so forth as modes of relatedness) and intersubjectivity (i.e. based in mutual recognition, but embracing abstractly rational and normatively universal, collectively binding, socio-symbolic-institutional structures), here Freud is setting the stage for a shift from drive theory to interpersonal and social psychology the object relations movement picked up. This is particularly the case for Winnicott, which Honneth largely relies on for his sources on Freud, who must form his own synthesis by subsuming drive theory into his new ideas, which at the time were controversial within conservative psychoanalytic circles.

The emotional processes of identification, internalization, and love as primary relatedness are all part of attachment processes that are relational in nature, as well as the specific acquisition of values and moral agency that accompany the development of the superego (*Über-Ich*) or conscience based upon the internalized interpersonal patterns of relatedness that come from familial and cultural life. Freud is quite clear when he attributes superego development to relational factors:

> Throughout later life it represents the influence of a person's childhood, of the care and education given him by his parents and of his dependence on them––a childhood which is prolonged so greatly in human beings by a family life in common. And in all this it is not only the personal qualities of these parents that is making itself felt, but also everything that had a determining effect on them themselves, the tastes and standards of the social class in which they lived and the innate dispositions and traditions of the race from which they sprang.[12]

In this pithy yet condensed paragraph, Freud perspicaciously captures the essence of character as an internalized identification with the parents' personal qualities, aesthetics, preferences and prejudices, group loyalties, and revered values that are socially constituted. Here Freud is emphasizing the nature of relationships within family life and how the peculiar aspects of certain personality traits and characteristics from one's parents are internalized within the subject, which were in turn historically instilled in one's parents from their own familial and cultural upbringing – what today we may refer to as the transgenerational transmission of family heritage. From this standpoint, psychic life cannot be bifurcated from familial life that resides within a community of others; and communal life cannot be understood unless it takes into account patterns of relatedness based on the types and qualities of relationships that historically constitute society.[13] All of these ontic – hence relational – preconditions are necessary for psychic maturation in general.

Precursors to Contemporary Psychoanalytic Theory

Philosophy remains largely unaware of the developments in post-classical schools of psychoanalysis since the time of Freud. The British object relations movement gained prominence in the United Kingdom after Freud's death and may be attributed to the pioneering works of Melanie Klein, D.W. Winnicott, and Donald Fairbairn, while during the same time period, but quite independently, attachment theory was introduced by John Bowlby. Ego psychology mainly dominated medicalized American training after this period championed by Anna Freud, Harry Guntrip, and Heinz Hartmann among others; however, Harry Stack Sullivan initiated the American Interpersonal tradition, which further led to the development of self psychology originated by Heinz Kohut.[14]

Since this time, contemporary movements have recapitulated a return to the object relations, interpersonal, and self psychological schools, which puts more emphasis on intersubjectivity, attachment, and relationality.[15]

As a forerunner to contemporary relational and intersubjectivity theory, object relations perspectives introduced a paradigm shift from the intrapsychic to the interpersonal, from the life of endogenous motives within to how the external environment, primarily caregivers, impacts on psychological development. Social philosophy remains largely ignorant of these post-classical developments within the psychoanalytic domain, and this fact matters, because post-classical movements have turned to the interpersonal in ways that throw light on socialization, a key concern of Critical Theory. Updating our understanding of the formation of the self and the role of the family and psychosocial matrices is of salient relevance to the Frankfurt School, for one of its innovations in materialist theory was to insist on the irreducibility of the individual and the importance of the family in society.

It was Donald Winnicott who primarily initiated this shift in emphasis in the field by introducing important concepts such as the "transitional object", the "holding environment", and the "good-enough mother", although other analysts such as Ian Suttie, Sándor Ferenczi, W.R.D. Fairbairn, Michael Balint, and Harry Stack Sullivan, to name a notable few, also emphasized the primacy of object-relationships that departed from classical theory. Object relations theorists generally agree that the loving, caring, affectionate, emotionally available, and empathically attuned responsiveness from the mother (or her surrogate) during childrearing shapes a secure personality, facilitates healthy self-development and social adaptation, and is the precursor to developing mature adult relations marked by the capacity for productivity, psychological stability, compassion for others, and emotional intimacy, among other personal qualities and prosocial attributes. Those who are deprived of or suffer from these early optimal experiences grow up with more challenges in living, coping, and flourishing, if not a crippled capacity for being.

Winnicott reminds us that transitional phenomena and the role of fantasy helps all people establish a psychological basis for reality. For Winnicott, transitional phenomena refer to the infant's attempt to differentiate self from (m)other inherent in the separation-individuation process, develop a sense of self and personal identity distinct from what is "not-me", and acquire personal autonomy through fantasy about objects (both illusory and symbolic) as a way of relating to the world separate from one's parents while at the same time developing a real relationship with them. When we refer to transitional objects or processes, popular analogues are a child's pacifier, soft objects (like a blanket), toys, or stuffed animals that are used to provide emotional comfort during times of separation or to substitute for the mother during her absence, but they can be any object or concept that serves as psychic organizers, which allows the subject to transition into developing a psychic space of individuation, independence, and personal control mediated through fantasy. These are cultivated psychic capacities, hence developmental accomplishments that allow a child to create an internal life and recognize objects that are not identical with the self. Objects come to represent a state of transition from the symbiotic (fantasized) merger with the mother to a differentiated matrix of being separate and existing outside of the child's own existence and relation to its mother. These phenomena may be said to transpire within all individuals beginning in infancy and forms the basis of imagination, thought, and creativity. In Winnicott's words,

> Transitional objects and transitional phenomena belong to the realm of illusion which is at the basis of initiation of experience. This early stage in development is made possible by the mother's special capacity for making adaptation to the needs of her infant, thus allowing the infant the illusion that what the infant creates *really exists*.[16]

Here illusion becomes the cornerstone for the *beginning* of experience; hence it provides a mediatory psychic function within an intermediary space. This "intermediate area of experience" is a border concept and provides the transitionary rubric necessary for fantasy construction. In other words, illusion intervenes in its apprehension and encounter with the real. Furthermore, the relation between reality and fantasy is blurred at this stage of infantile development, where each is collapsed into an isomorphism of the other.

Transitional objects and phenomena are psychically constructed (hence imagined) as a means to secure attachment, sustain maternal comfort and affectional bonds during absences, self-soothe, and ward off depressive anxiety and negative emotional events that besiege the nascent psyche, as well as channel destructive fantasies. Extending the notion of transitional phenomena as transmutational internal objects that perform a particular self-regulatory function, Heinz Kohut introduced the notion of a "selfobject",[17] which is an aspect of an object incorporated into the self, usually another person or a part or property of another person, but it can also be an inanimate object or abstract idea that carries a particular quality and performs a certain internal task of maintaining psychic continuity and cohesion of the self. To be more precise, it is the *function* that constitutes the selfobject and not the person, for it is the *experiences* evoked by such objects that allow us to analyze their internal presence and affects. For Kohut, selfobject experiences become the building blocks of psychic reality and serve to mirror the intrinsic worth and integrity of the subject as well as validate and strengthen self-structure. Functional objects and their representations become the evoking-sustaining-responding matrix that maintains self-organization, facilitates healing in the disruption-restoration process, and contributes to the undoing of self-injury incurred by the experiential subject when it undergoes depletion, fragmentation, or emptiness. Winnicott's framework can be expanded to accommodate Kohut's conceptual scheme of the selfobject. It is here that Honneth's reliance on Winnicott becomes ripe for a Kohutian revision.

In psychological terms, selfobject representations are derivative of unconscious motivations, conflicts, values, and narcissistic longings the internalized selfobject contributes to psychic economy, which serves to maintain and restore the self from internal rupture. Selfobjects preserve specific transferences as intrapsychic relations to internalized imagoes that evoke and facilitate an enduring state of self-cohesion, even though self-structure is always in flux and undergoes permutations. One of the most important selfobject function is that of *mirroring*, where the sense of acceptance, recognition, and appreciation is conceived as a confirming and validating aspect of the self; as well as *idealizing* functions, where inner resonance states evoke perfection and ideality and conserve a sense of goodness through identification with the infallible idealized selfobject, qualities that are lacking in the subject yet vicariously fulfilled through such idealization, twinship, or merger fantasies with the revered other or their representations. Both transitional phenomena and selfobject experiences place great importance on the maternal "facilitative" environment, or more specifically, on the attachment system between child and mother, which is the locus of the developmental capacity for mutual recognition.

Attachment Theory and Relationality

One of the most celebrated findings in contemporary psychological research is the centrality of attachment in human development.[18] Attachment is a universal biosocial instinct influenced by the contingencies of the maternal environment comprising innate motivations to procure safety via proximity to selected love objects during early childhood, most often one's parents or their surrogates. Object attachment is a unique and special form of affectional bond to a select few identified caregivers and is characterized as a process of emotional connection based upon affective ties, relational longings, and primary identifications with love objects. Attachment processes are normative in every human culture, are highly influential on neurological development and the regulatory system, right hemisphere brain lateralization, affect regulation, and the development of personality, adjustment, and psychopathology.[19]

Attachment patterns become organized at the representational and behavioural levels. Representational models or schemas of self and others are constructed and serve to facilitate internal cohesion of the self, judge the accessibility and willingness of figures to provide functions of protection, warmth, and care, and to guide future appraisals and goal-directed behaviour. Beginning in infancy, we develop such internal working models of self and others that are both positive and negative in content and form. Healthy representations are equated with feelings of lovability and security in the child, while dysfunctional representations proliferate when the attachment figure is perceived negatively, which leads to various defensive exclusions or strategies that allow the child to cope with negativity, intrusiveness, and incongruity that jeopardizes one's psychological sense of safety. Within all these psychoanalytic schools, it becomes easy to appreciate how early interactional patterns by parents, family members, and caregivers condition relationality and the development of the self, social adaptation and maladjustment, and how the transitional subject comes to view society and the world at large.

Psyche and Socialization

With the introduction of the British school of psychoanalysis, the bridge from unconscious fantasy to the external presence of others, drive theory to primary relatedness, and the self within society, the subject-object split was closed. As with Freud's qualification that individual psychic processes can never stand apart from social psychology and the cultural environs that impact on both personal subjectivity and the objective conditions that interpolate society, so too many critical theorists turned to psychoanalytic paradigms to bolster social philosophy. For Marcuse, psychological categories are political categories and are inseparable from the broader sociological forces that shape civilization. As he tells us, "psychological problems turn into political problems: private disorder reflects more directly than before the disorder of the whole, and the cure of the personal disorder depends more directly than before on the cure of the general disorder",[20] namely, sick society. Marcuse is very clear in his insistence that the individual is determined by "the societal forces which define the psyche".[21] Yet at the same time, psychology becomes the foundation of sociology and the cultural dynamics and institutional organizations that in turn inform the psychological.

If you begin with the premise that all human beings are psychological creatures and that all inner experience is psychologically mediated, then by natural extension this would apply to the notion of the social, and specifically the politics of desire instantiated within any community. And if you start with the premise that the psychological is shaped by the social, then the same argument applies. Groups are psychologically informed and inform others right down to a single subject, whether this applies to our families, cohorts, communities, the provincial or nation state, and so forth. From Jung to Heidegger and Lacan, we are thrown into a collective psychic matrix and socio-symbolic order that informs our being in the world. Here the individual develops within the social, and the social within the individual.

Although this may seem patently circular, causal questions are always tricky and subject to paradox and undecidability in providing an unequivocal explanans. That is why it may prove useful to view these dichotomous categories as comprising a dialectical structure where neither can be discussed in isolation nor are ontologically separate from one other, for each are mutually implicative in any discourse we posit about human beings. This is why I prefer to bracket such antinomies and view the self in relation to itself and others within worldhood as being *overdetermined* in causal influence and import. One does not have to bifurcate the arrangements of society from naturalized psychology to see how their dynamic processes and co-occurrence pressurize and inform one other within a systemic unit. We can surely observe how certain structures and political policies within societies lead to more problems in living and suffering in individuals, and how natural psychological processes such as desire, envy, greed, rage, entitlement, aggression, and so on are intensified and play out through pathological enactments when societies undergo material deprivation, economic austerity, tragedy, trauma, war, political oppression, and so on. When social institutions, capitalistic enterprise, and the populace do not acknowledge or recognize disenfranchised subgroups and the extreme hardships they face due to race, socioeconomic, and educational disparities that privileged classes do not face, social fabrics begin to fray in tatters.

Psychoanalytic Recognition Theory

As I have mentioned elsewhere,[22] contemporary recognition theory has much to gain by engaging psychoanalytic recognition theory. The notions of recognition and intersubjectivity form a central position in contemporary psychoanalytic discourse,[23] particularly amongst object relations, self psychology, interpersonal, and relational traditions,[24] not to mention its primacy in the consulting room.[25] In her annexation of Hegel, Jessica Benjamin has advocated for moving beyond the doer and done-to binary to advocating for a tertiary moral comportment of recognition the analyst is obliged to adopt in treatment,[26] while Marilyn Nissim-Sabat argues that dysrecognition should be viewed as neither victimization nor survival.[27] Although there are many nuanced theories of intersubjectivity in psychoanalysis that have emphasized various characteristics over others,[28] which I have critiqued at length,[29] the details of which do not concern us here, there is typically a privileging of the respective subjectivities that form the analytic dyad as a reciprocal relational unit, even if such relations are asymmetrical. Whether in society or the clinic, psychoanalysis is sensitive to power differentials and their unconscious relations that give rise to modes of entrenched opposition, need for control, resistance to others' demands,

pathological accommodation, subjugation, and transferential enactments that thwart mutual recognition. This is why, in part, the ethical turn in psychoanalysis is enjoying a resurgence of consciousness raising and social activism that echoes the earlier days of Critical Theory.[30]

Given that Honneth finds Stern to be an extension (if not a corrective) of Winnicott, the nuances post-object relations perspectives have to offer are worth noting in future efforts at initiating dialogue and generating a simpatico – if not synthesis – with Critical Theory. From drive to ego, object, self, relationality, and intersubjectivity – all transpiring within intrapsychic, interpersonal, familial, and communal organizations within our social and cultural ontology, psychoanalysis has moved a long way from post-classical models while subsuming these theoretical developments within new traditions of thought. Because the nuances are so vast, they are beyond the scope of this immediate project. But with any theoretical developments, suffice it to say that it becomes a matter of *emphasis*. While we may focus on these redirecting categorical shifts in theory (clinical, social, applied) or on the microdynamics of specific forms, contexts, contents, and functions, such as in attachment processes, affectivity, empathic attunement, mentalization, mirroring, relational vulnerability, shame, the intersubjective system that comprises the mutual negotiation and co-construction of the analytic dyad, hence the interpersonal field that entwines two subjects in their relational engagement, and so on, we can readily see that contemporary psychoanalytic thought has something to offer Critical Theory.

Psychoanalysis from classical theory to attachment and objects relations perspectives, the interpersonal and self psychology schools, and new directions in the emphasis on egalitarianism within relationality as a mutual intersubjective exchange all capitalize on the primacy of a *recognizing principle* where acknowledgment, validation, empathy, emotional attunement, and genuinely relating to another subject as a human being is coveted. This view is further informed by the developmental, behavioural, and cognitive neurosciences that recognize how psychological processes are advanced in individuals and societies when such parameters are observed, which carries tangible benefits to citizens who advance their own child-rearing practices, social institutions, and culture. In the end, people grow up to be happier, better adjusted, more productive, capable of nurturing the psychological needs of their children, and contribute to society as a whole.

Concluding Postscript

Psychoanalysis teaches us that whatever values and ideals societies adopt, they are always mediated through unconscious psychic processes[31] that condition the collective in both positive and negative ways, and in terms of relations of recognition and patterns of social justice. Contemporary critical theory may benefit from engaging post-classical and current trends in psychoanalytic thought that have direct bearing on the ways we conceive of and observe how individuals operate within social collectives. Implications for Critical Theory need to reflect upon how the psychosocial matrix of self and society both facilitate and hinder optimal social arrangements and fabrics of justice as it takes up the question of normativity. The tensions between normative development, individual identity formation, social reproduction, concepts of justice, legal and political equality, economic redistribution, social ethics and democracy, institutionalized relations of

recognition, moral reason, and the pursuit of human freedom all have overlapping and interdependent ontic manifestations.

Critical theory cannot negate the reality of social pathology,[32] but rather engage its origins, appearances, conflictual dynamics, mitigating circumstances, and unintended consequences of the prevailing conditions of socialization on their own terms with the hope that an applied psychoanalytic expatiation on social phenomenology can expand the depth and breadth of human relations and open up a permissible space for interdisciplinary discussion. Engaging the more nuanced perspectives of contemporary psychoanalysis has the potential to sharpen Critical Theory as a discipline and unlock new possibilities toward collaboration, synthesis, and unification, an agenda we must leave for future research.

Notes

1. Honneth, *The I in We*, 195.
2. Honneth, *The I in We*, 195–6.
3. Honneth, *The I in We*, 195.
4. Honneth, *The I in We*, 198–9.
5. See Honneth, *The I in We*, 200.
6. Freud, *Instincts and Their Vicissitudes*, 122.
7. Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, 105. Later Freud, *New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis* reiterates this point more clearly: "Identification (*Identifizierung*) … [is] the assimilation of one ego [*Ich*] to another one, as a result of which the first ego behaves like the second in certain respects, imitates it and in a sense takes it up into itself" (63).
8. Freud, *New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*, 63.
9. Freud, *Female Sexuality*, 225.
10. Freud, *An Outline of Psycho-Analysis*, 188.
11. Ibid.
12. Freud, *An Outline of Psycho-Analysis*, 209.
13. Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* fully appreciated the *social phenomena* involved in psychic development and he specifically tells us so:

    > Rarely and under certain exceptional conditions is individual psychology in a position to disregard the relations of this individual to others. In the individual's mental life someone else is invariably involved, as a model, as an object, as a helper, as an opponent; and so from the very first individual psychology … is at the same time social psychology as well (69).

    Within this same context, Freud emphasizes "the relations of an individual to his parents", as well as siblings, friends, love interests, and even his doctor – namely, the psychoanalyst: "in fact all the relations which have hitherto been the chief subject of psycho-analytic research – may claim to be considered as social phenomena" (69).
14. See Bacal and Newman, *Theories of Object Relations* for a review.
15. See my critique in *Conundrums: A Critique of Contemporary Psychoanalysis* (Mills, *Conundrums*).
16. Winnicott, *Playing and Reality*, 14.
17. Kohut, *The Analysis of the Self* first makes reference to "self-objects" as "objects which are themselves experienced as part of the self" (xiv).
18. Inspired by the pioneering work of John Bowlby and Mary Ainsworth, there has been a spate of research in infant observation, child development, cognitive and social psychology, evolutionary biology, neuroscience, psychopathology, clinical assessment, psychotherapy, and

ethnology that support attachment theory as a viable explanatory model of human development. Contemporary researchers such as Mary Main, Judith Solomon, Carol George, Erik Hesse, Peter Fonagy, Mary Target, Karlen Lyons-Ruth, Beatrice Beebe, Alan Shore, and Arietta Slade are just a few notable academics and clinicians who have made substantial contributions in this area (see Mills, *Relational and Intersubjective Perspectives in Psychoanalysis*, and Cassidy and Shaver, *Handbook of Attachment*, for an overview).

19. Although Honneth relies largely on Daniel Stern, who he takes to provide compelling evidence for an extension and correction of Winnicott on attachment, all contemporary attachment theory is premised on developmental science and the outgrowth and extensions of the seminal work of Bowlby (*A Secure Base*; *Attachment and Loss*), Winnicott's contemporary. Bowlby's classical model of attachment rests on the interrelatedness of three main constructs: (1) Activation of the attachment behavioural system; (2) The role of self and object representations; and (3) Strategies at defensive exclusion. For the field of developmental psychology, the attachment system is an evolutionarily informed process that motivates and regulates internal goal-directed behaviours and intentions aimed to promote and procure proximity to love objects for the purpose of protection from encroaching threats that may disrupt desired levels of security. A variety of internal and external conditions may affect the system including perceived alterations in the environment as well as the dispositions and behaviours of attachment figures, which leads to a dynamic tension between the mother's and infant's individual needs. Low activation levels are correlated with positive internal states and feelings of safety, while high activation levels are mobilized during the presence of intense negative affect, anxiety, alarm, fear, or dread. When the attachment figure is perceived as being unavailable or inconsistent, apprehension, anger, and sadness are typical accompanying emotional reactions.

20. Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization*, 21.
21. Ibid.
22. See Mills, "Dysrecognition and Social Pathology."
23. See Benjamin, "Beyond Doer and Done To"; Mills, *The Unconscious Abyss*; Stolorow and Atwood, *Contexts of Being*.
24. See Bacal and Newman, *Theories of Object Relations*; Mitchell, *Relationality*.
25. Mills, *Treating Attachment Pathology*; Stolorow, Brandchaft, and Atwood, *Psychoanalytic Treatment: An Intersubjective Approach*.
26. Benjamin, "Beyond Doer and Done To."
27. Nissim-Sabat, *Neither Victim Nor Survivor*.
28. Cf. Aron, *A Meeting of Minds*; Lacan, *Écrits*; Orange, Atwood, and Stolorow, *Working Intersubjectively*; Renik, "Analytic Interaction."
29. See Mills, (*Relational and Intersubjective Perspectives in Psychoanalysis*; *Conundrums*).
30. Goodman and Severson, *The Ethical Turn*; Kiehl, Saba, and Samuels, *Analysis and Activism*; Orange, *Nourishing the Inner Life of Clinicians and Humanitarians*.
31. Although the different schools of psychoanalytic thought offer their own nuanced theoretical frameworks, one universal belief is that there are unconscious processes operating within the psyche that stand in relation to social organizations that reinforce them. See Mills, *Underworlds* for a comprehensive overview of the philosophies of the unconscious in Hegel, Freud, Jung, Lacan, Heidegger, Sartre, Winnicott, and Whitehead.
32. See Mills, "Recognition and *Pathos*."

Disclosure statement

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