



## THE FALSE DASEIN: FROM HEIDEGGER TO SARTRE AND PSYCHOANALYSIS<sup>1</sup>

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### ABSTRACT

*The analysis of Dasein's struggle for authenticity will be the main focus of this article. By virtue of Dasein's ontological predispositions, selfhood is subjected to inauthentic existential modalities already constitutive of its Being. In the case of the false Dasein, fallenness is exacerbated in that Dasein constricts its comportment primarily to the modes of the inauthentic, thereby abdicating its potentiality-for-Being. The false Dasein results from ontical encounters within pre-existing deficient ontological conditions of Being-in-the-world that are thrust upon selfhood as its facticity. These deficient ontological structures predispose Dasein to develop intrapsychic psychological deficits that further contribute to Dasein's false existence. Through the medium of Heidegger's existential ontology, Sartrean bad faith, and psychoanalysis, I will demonstrate that the throes of selfhood encompass a dialectical course meandering through experiential modes of authenticity and falsehood, in which this very process itself is an authentic enterprise, that is, it is the necessary constitutional structure of Dasein itself as Being-toward-becoming its possibilities.*

What does it mean to be authentic? Perhaps this is a question one can never adequately answer. As elusive as the meaning of being, the question of authenticity existentially moans for a response. Within the context of Heidegger's existential ontology, the investigation of Dasein's struggle for authenticity will be the central focus of this article. While Heidegger was primarily concerned with the question of Being (*Sein*) rather than the nature of beings (*Seiende*), he was deeply interested in the interface between philosophy and psychology.<sup>2</sup> Despite Heidegger's apathy toward psychoanalysis,<sup>3</sup> his conceptualization of Dasein has direct and significant contributions for psychoanalytic thought. While there are potential conceptual discrepancies between the ontological discourse of Heideggerian theory

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and the ontical discourse of psychodynamic approaches,<sup>4</sup> Heidegger's existential ontology has profound implications for understanding the ontology of the unconscious and the question of authenticity.

For Heidegger, authenticity is a uniquely temporal structure and a process of unfolding possibility. It is a state of being that is active, teleological, contemplative, and congruent—an agency burgeoning with quiescent potentiality.<sup>5</sup> As such, authenticity is the process of becoming one's possibilities, and by nature it is idiosyncratic and uniquely subjective. Generally we might say that selfhood vacillates between authentic and inauthentic modes, that it tarries with genuine inauthenticity only to find itself genuinely authentic. Selfhood therefore participates in many forms on its acclivity toward the apprehension of its possibilities and ontological priorities that constitute its very being. Perhaps selfhood is beyond this antithetical distinction: it merely is what it is. Perhaps authenticity is beyond the individual: it ultimately belongs to the very ontology that constitutes Being itself.

In its disclosedness, humankind is recalcitrant; it has the need to divulge itself as inauthenticity. Not only does Dasein unveil itself in the everyday, mundane modes of existence, but it does so in a false manner. But what does it mean for Dasein to be false, that is, what are the conditions that influence the development of inauthenticity? Within this context, truth and falsity are regarded not in terms of their epistemic verity but in reference to Dasein's states of authentic and inauthentic disclosedness. Given this denotation, is it possible that the very ontological structures of Dasein itself are false? Can the Being of Dasein be thrown into a deficit world, a world tainted by fallenness and inauthenticity, so much so that Dasein's Being-in-the-world is predetermined as a falsehood? To what degree is worldhood itself structurally differentiated into various existential modalities that are inauthentic, thereby affecting Dasein's modes of being and the very ways in which selfhood is disclosed? I will demonstrate that the throes of selfhood encompass a dialectical course undulating through experiential modes of authenticity and inauthenticity, in which this very process itself is an authentic one, that is, it is the necessary, a priori structure of Dasein itself as Being-toward-possibility.

#### DASEIN AND FALLENNESS

In his philosophical treatise *Being and Time* (1927), Heidegger offers an existential ontology of selfhood as *Dasein* (there-being), the concretely existing human being who is there, as part of a world. In

Dasein's original disclosedness as Being-in-the-world, one is thrust into the ontological contingency of "Being-in" (around-world) an environment (*Umwelt*) and "Being-with" (with-world) others (*Mitwelt*) and with-oneself (own-world) (*Eigenwelt*), which underlies all participation, engagement, and concrete involvement with the world that is *given* in one's immediate preoccupations and concerns. Thus, the world itself is constitutive of Dasein's Being, for "Being-in-the-world is a state of Dasein which is necessary *a priori*, but it is far from sufficient for completely determining Dasein's Being" (p. 79). As Heidegger explicates, Dasein's Being takes on a particular character *a priori*, and exists within the modes of authentic and inauthentic disclosedness.

Dasein exists. Furthermore, Dasein is an entity which in each case I myself am. Mineness belongs to any existent Dasein, and belongs to it as the conditions which make authenticity and inauthenticity possible. (p. 78)

The modes of Dasein's disclosedness are already structurally constituted in Dasein's Being-in-the-world. However, they are only the existentials conditions, which make authenticity and inauthenticity possible. As Heidegger points out, these two modes of disclosedness must have ownership, that is, they necessarily belong to the subjective, singular Dasein. For our purposes, Dasein (composed of its ontological and existential dimensions disclosed as Being-in-the-world), is to be understood within the context of *selfhood*.

Heidegger delineates the factuality of Dasein, as the self, which is characterized by humankind's naked "thereness," its abandonment as thrown into the publicness of "the they." As human beings disclose themselves in the everydayness of Being-in-the-world, they discover that they have been thrust into an environment without consultation or choice, and have been abandoned to chance factors which already constitute their Being. Therefore, a fundamental propensity of Dasein belongs to everydayness and manifests itself as *das Man*.

*Das Man*, one among "the they," is Dasein's ontological destiny. The world is a world which one shares with others in communal proximity. Thus, Dasein's communal structure lends itself to a participation that cannot be annulled, namely, that of *theyness*. By virtue of Dasein's communal character, one cannot *not* participate in a world determined by the pragmatics of society and the everyday concerns that structure Dasein's activities.

For Heidegger, the question of authenticity becomes intimately associated with the existential character of Dasein as concern and solicitude. He states:

If Dasein-with remains existentially constitutive for Being-in-the-world, then . . . it must be interpreted in terms of the phenomenon of *care*, for as "care" the Being of Dasein in general is to be defined. (p. 157)

Just as Dasein's relation to the environment is that of practical concern, Dasein's relation to the communal world is that of personal concern. As Heidegger explains, this form of concern, belonging to everydayness by necessity, will ultimately lead to modes of inauthenticity. As the "anonymous one," the uniqueness of selfhood is diffused and lost in depersonalization and "averageness."

Being for, against, or without one another, passing one another by, not "mattering" to one another—these are possible ways of solicitude. And it is precisely these last-named deficient and indifferent modes that characterize everyday, average Being-with-one-another. (p. 158)

Heidegger expounds upon another structural element in the ontological constitution of Dasein, "fallenness." This is the universal tendency of human beings to lose themselves in the everydayness of present concerns and preoccupations, to such a degree that it alienates them from their personal and unique future possibilities, thus reducing the fallen *das Man* to a mere "presence-at-hand." He posits:

This "absorption in . . ." has mostly the character of Being-lost in the publicness of the "they." Dasein has, in the first instance, fallen away from itself as an authentic potentiality for Being its Self, and has fallen into the "world." (p. 220)

While, on one hand, everydayness and fallenness are ontological and natural predispositions of Dasein, and therefore devoid of any value judgments attached to them, nevertheless, on the other hand, they are modes of inauthenticity, which cannot be avoided nor refused. The degree to which one participates in these inauthentic modes, however, has a direct bearing on the existential status of falsehood. As a perpetual mode of inauthenticity, the falseness of Dasein becomes manifested as a "levelling down . . . of all possibilities of Being" (p. 165). The fallenness of Dasein is expressed most ostensibly through idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity. Gossip is an inauthentic use of discourse which simply repeats what is heard and accepted

by the public without critically examining the grounds or validity of the subject matter. Idle talk is merely a repetition of the conventional, an unscrutinized acceptance of the interpretations of the public. The fallen *das Man* is not concerned with understanding the ontological priorities of what is blindly accepted as truth or fact, only in reiterating the public cliché's of the "anonymous one." Curiosity, which parallels gossip, underscores Dasein's voracious hunger to explore its environment merely for the sake of discovering novelty that provides excitement, a pleasurable distraction, and knowledge simply in order to have known. Curiosity, therefore, is not motivated out of the need for authentic understanding, it is merely an inauthentic form of concern. Ambiguity, on the other hand, is the dubious nature of information which is disseminated by "the they," which makes it impossible to determine what was disclosed in genuine understanding and what was not. This ambiguity is not only about the public gossip, but also in reference to Being-with-one-another and Dasein's Being-toward itself, hence, an inauthentic relatedness.

At this point, we must further clarify what we mean by Dasein's falsehood. In his essay *On the Essence of Truth*, Heidegger (1949/1977) explicates the Greeks' understanding of ἀλήθεια as disclosedness or unconcealment. Truth may only be disclosed from its hiddenness in a clearing that opens a space for unconcealment. Equally, as each space reveals the potentiality for truth to be made known, there is also, conversely, a closing in that truth may only be revealed in the wake of concealment. Such movement of uncovering in the presence of covering underlies the dialectical participation of the nature of truth. Given Heidegger's very careful analysis of *aletheia*, how can Dasein be false? From this standpoint, truth and falsity are in reference to unconcealed states of Dasein's disclosedness, not in terms of their epistemological status. Therefore, the anonymous one, the fallen *das Man*, the identification with "the they" of everydayness as averageness, is a direct allusion to a constricted Dasein. This inauthentic mode of Being is a retreat from the ontological obligations that Dasein demands. In these extreme modes, Dasein is a reduced self, a stifled existence, a false Being. In addition, the false Dasein, as Being-in and Being-with "the they," starts to take on an existential character which is more negative, similar to Kierkegaard's notion of "the crowd," or even more pejoratively, the Nietzschean "herd." The Dasein who has fallen into falsehood closes itself off from authentically Being-in-the-world, and even more significantly of Being-with and Being-toward itself. In psychoanalysis, this might

be chalked up to the defense mechanism of denial, that is, people need to deny the ontological obligations of Dasein in the service of more primordial psychological needs or conflicts, such as psychodynamic motivations surrounding security, attachment, and, as Heidegger points out, "tranquility." But as he continues to point out, this tranquility leads to an "aggravation" and alienation of Dasein from itself. Heidegger states:

When Dasein, tranquilized, and "understanding" everything, thus compares itself with everything, it drifts along toward an alienation in which its ownmost potentiality-for-Being is hidden from it. (p. 222)

This dialectical conflict, brought about by fallenness, then leads to the "downward plunge" into the inauthentic Being of "the they," in which authentic possibility is lost in obscurity and under the guise of "ascending" and "living concretely." Is it possible, however, that this downhill plunge is a necessary one which provides the dialectical movement toward the fulfillment of Dasein's possibilities? Perhaps this turbulent necessity is the very authentic movement of Dasein toward itself as *becoming*. Rather than falling away from itself, Dasein is falling into itself. But this is only possible if Dasein becomes aware of its possibilities which it hides from itself. At this point we must ask: Why does Dasein close off its possibilities in the tranquility of fallenness rather than seize them authentically? In other words, why does it hide from itself its own potentiality-for-Being? Perhaps Dasein is afraid, afraid of its freedom.

#### DASEIN IN BAD FAITH

In offering an existential analysis of the false Dasein, we have determined that Dasein's fundamental structure is ontologically oriented toward fallenness. In the case of the false Dasein, however, fallenness is exacerbated in that Dasein constricts its comportment primarily to the modes of the inauthentic, thereby abdicating its potentiality-for-Being. Why would Dasein abnegate its potentiality? While theoretically distinct from Heidegger's existential ontology, Sartre's conception of inauthenticity may contribute to our understanding of the psychological-ontical processes immersed in Dasein's falsehood.<sup>6</sup> In his magnum opus, *Being and Nothingness* (1956), Sartre introduced the notion of *mauvaise foi*, or bad faith. For Sartre, consciousness is Being, "a being, the nature of which is to question its own being, that being implying a being other than itself," that is, "to be conscious of the nothingness of its being" (p. 86). Therefore,

the authentic Being is literally *no-thing*. The failure to define oneself as *other-than* what one is, is to reify oneself as a thing and thus deny the possibility of a future transcendence. Such self-negation is the pinnacle of inauthenticity. Sartre asserts, "consciousness instead of directing its negation outward turns it toward itself. This attitude, it seems to me, is *bad faith* [mauvaise foi]" (p. 87). Generally, bad faith may be characterized as self-deception, a lie to oneself. But how can one lie to oneself? Only if one is not consciously aware of such intentions to lie or to deceive. For the individual in bad faith, the nature of such a lie "is not recognized by the liar as *his* intention" (p. 88). While a genuine lie is a "behavior of transcendence," the bad-faith lie is a denial of such possibility. Such is the case that the liar finds him/herself as the victim of his/her own self-deception and lives in falsehood.

By the lie consciousness affirms that it exists by nature as *hidden from the Other*; it utilizes for its own profit the ontological duality of myself and myself in the eyes of the Other. The situation cannot be the same for bad faith if this, as we have said, is indeed a lie to oneself. To be sure, the one who practices bad faith is hiding a displeasing truth or presenting a pleasing untruth. Bad faith then has in appearance the structure of falsehood. Only what changes everything is the fact that in bad faith it is from myself that I am hiding the truth. (pp. 88-89)

Sartre's notion of bad faith is intimately linked to his model of consciousness. He recognized two levels of consciousness, namely, (1) consciousness as intentionality and self-reflection and (2) pre-reflective consciousness. The former is consciousness as such and encompasses awareness of the self as a human subject. Pre-reflective consciousness, on the other hand, is the form of consciousness prior to being aware (of) an object for reflection. This is similar to Freud's notion of pre-consciousness, that is, one is not immediately aware of an internal event or object but could be if one's attention were drawn to that particular object for reflection. Sartre vociferously repudiated the notion of the Freudian unconscious; instead, his model espouses Brentano's concept of intentionality. Consciousness is always conscious *of* or *about* something—conscious of some object we posit or place before us for reflection. Therefore, there is no inertia to consciousness; consciousness is not an object nor does it exist in itself. For Sartre, consciousness can be positional or non-positional. Consciousness that posits places an object before it for immediate reflection; non-positional consciousness is consciousness

by itself. Consciousness is experienced as a "lack," a *hole* in being. In Sartre's view, consciousness is nothingness, a freedom compelled to fill its own lack through projects. Therefore, consciousness is what it is not and is not what it is. For Sartre, we are more than what we can be if we are reduced to what we are. What we are is freedom, and as freedom we are transcendence.<sup>7</sup>

Bad faith can manifest itself in various existential modalities, from singular, situational choices to patterns of self-deception or, as one could argue, character structure. Nevertheless, there is a double face to bad faith, namely, (1) facticity and (2) transcendence. In the first case, bad faith is the failure to accept one's facticity. In the second, it is a failure of transcendence. For example, Sartre portrays a woman who consents to go out with a man for the first time and in her bad faith she denies his intentions behind the seductions of his conduct. "She does not want to realize the urgency" of the moment and "refuses to apprehend the desire for what it is" (pp. 96-97). Throughout the flirtations, her companion places her in such a position as to require an immediate decision. Her desire is disguised by the various procedures she uses to maintain herself in this self-deception. Her "aim is to postpone the moment of decision as long as possible" (p. 97). In this example, the woman has failed to project a future and has allowed herself not to take notice of the reality of the situation. Her decision rests in the locus of pre-reflective consciousness; she chose not to posit a future with this gentleman, thus deceiving herself of such possibility. Sartre relates:

She has disarmed the actions of her companion by reducing them to being only what they are; that is, to existing in the mode of the in-itself. But she permits herself to enjoy his desire, to the extent that she will apprehend it as not being what it is, will recognize its transcendence. (pp. 97-98)

The woman has reduced herself to a thing, a passive object in which events can happen to her that she can neither provoke nor avoid. In bad faith, the person is in possession of the truth but fails to acknowledge it as such, thereby avoiding the responsibility it requires.

For Sartre, authenticity or good faith is when you represent yourself to yourself in the mode of being what you are not. The bad faith attitude is one in which the individual seeks to flee from their freedom and the obligations it demands by construing themselves as a thing, a Being-in-itself, rather than a Being-for-itself. Instead of "I am in the mode of being what I am *not*," the bad faith attitude is



"I am in the mode of being what I am," thus, a thing-in-itself. In short, as human agents we *must* choose. As long as one consciously chooses in freedom and accepts full responsibility of one's actions, one is in good faith. Human beings define and redefine themselves via their choices. Decisions are made in the interest of a value, or one is in bad faith. This is the case when one fails to choose, or, more appropriately, when one *chooses not to choose* authentically.

Sartre's portrayal of bad faith elucidates the psychological nuances of self-deception that are structurally instantiated in Dasein's ontical practices. For Heidegger, bad faith would be a deficient mode of Dasein's Being-in-the-world: more specifically, Being-with-oneself and Being-toward one's future authentic possibilities. Within this general context, Dasein's fallenness is bad faith, a falsehood, a retreat into the everydayness of theyness cloaked by self-deception. Furthermore, to deny our human reality as freedom by defining ourselves as a thing is Dasein's propensity to reduce itself to a mere "presence-at-hand."

If Sartre's depiction of bad faith is accurate, then every human being is in self-deception at one time or another. In fact, this is a necessary ontical condition of Dasein itself. Due to our penchant to fall into inauthentic modes of Being-in-the-world, Dasein will inevitably engage in such deceptive practices. For Sartre, we are condemned to freedom, which necessitates radical responsibility for our Being-for-itself. However, choices are made in the context of our ontological facticity, and thus are affected by a milieu which, by definition, is deficient or inauthentic. Sartre's position ultimately demands Being to transcend its ontological structures via choice. To what degree is this possible? Furthermore, he ostensibly denies the primordial motivations of the dynamic unconscious. While Sartre rejected the psychoanalytic project, his delineation of inauthenticity contributes to the psychodynamic conceptualization of the primacy of ego organization in personality development. Again, we might say that bad faith is a defensive form of denial, a disavowal in the service of unconscious motivations, conflicts, and wishes. Sartre assumes that *every* Being has the *same* developmental capacities and intrapsychic structures to choose authentically as a free agent. But what if one's freedom to recognize authentic choices has been truncated due to structural deficits in psychological development? As in the case of selfhood's ontological conditions that are predetermined, is it possible that Being itself is robbed of its full potential for authenticity?

## THE FALSE SELF

Hitherto, our exegetical treatment of Dasein has depicted the tussles of selfhood as encompassing an ontologically structured falsehood that presupposes, a priori, Dasein's existential disclosedness as Being-in-the-world. While the predisposition toward inauthenticity is an elemental edifice instantiated within Dasein's facticity, the specific psychological-ontical dimensions of Dasein's falseness need further exploration. Dasein's psychological structures become more lucid with the assistance of a psychoanalytic explication of the self, which in turn enhances Heideggerian philosophy. While Freud never offered a systematic theory of the self, the notion of the self is implicit in his final structural model of the mind.<sup>8</sup> Within contemporary psychoanalysis, psychodynamic conceptualizations of the self inhere primarily to relational perspectives vis-à-vis Kohutian self-psychology, whereas Freud's classical paradigm has devolved into object relations and self-object theories. The psychological dissection of authenticity becomes increasingly more important when we examine a particular modality of Dasein's being, namely, the false self.

What would it be like to not know who you are, to be alienated from your true sense of self? What would it be like to have to construct an identity that is ingenuine and artificially manufactured? What would it be like to not feel real? Within psychoanalysis, there has been a burgeoning interest in the clinical literature on the concept of the false self (Cassimatis, 1984; Chescheir, 1985; Khan, 1971; Lerner, 1985; Schacht, 1988). The inauthentic self, or the "as if" personality, further deepens our understanding of the false Dasein. Winnicott (1960) formally introduced the notion of the false self. While some parallels exist between Heidegger's exposition of the fallen Dasein and Sartre's depiction of bad faith, Winnicott's contributions to understanding the question of authenticity deserve special merit. For Winnicott, a false self is the result of developmental conflict encountered in the child-maternal relationship. As a result, a false self is constructed as a defensive system which remains unconsciously maintained. Winnicott's theoretical framework falls within a defense model, which is ultimately tied to drive theory within the interpersonal context of the mother-child dyad. While having a ground in Freudian metapsychology, Winnicott's conceptualization of the false self, however, is essentially a relational theory centering on ego-defensive maneuvers that arise in response to environmental demands. More specifically, within the infant-mother milieu, the child struggles to manage libidinal impulses that are solely intrapsychic; however,

this takes place within the context of the interpersonal and intersubjective phenomenal field of the relational matrix. Therefore, within the stage of the first object-relationships, various defenses are constructed in response to external demands, namely, those of the maternal object. Thus, ego organization is in the service of adaptation to the environment and procurement of object attachment. Repeated compliance to such demands, concomitant with a withdrawal from self-generated spontaneity, leads to an increased stifling of impulses constitutive of the natural drive for spontaneous expression, thereby culminating in a false-self development.

For Winnicott, the idea of a true self originates in the capacity of the infant to recognize and enact spontaneous needs for self-expression. "Only the True Self can be creative and only the True Self can feel real" (p. 148). Thus, the notion of the self as the center of spontaneity that has the "experience of aliveness" constitutes the core or heart of authenticity. However, this ability to enact such spontaneous gestures is contingent upon the responsiveness of the "good-enough mother" within an appropriate "holding environment." Thus, the etiology of the true and false self is contingent upon the quality of maternal responsiveness. Winnicott postulates:

The good-enough mother meets the omnipotence of the infant and to some extent makes sense of it. She does this repeatedly. A True Self begins to have life, through the strength given to the infant's weak ego by the mother's implementation of the infant's omnipotent expressions. (p. 145)

The true self flourishes only in response to the repeated success of the mother's optimal responsiveness to the infant's spontaneous expressions. If the mother is "not good-enough," she does not facilitate the infant's omnipotence and repeatedly fails to meet the child's spontaneous gestures with appropriate responsiveness. Instead she substitutes her own gestures, which the infant complies with; thereby, this repeated compliance becomes the ground for the earliest mode of the false-self existence, due to the mother's inability to sense and respond optimally to her infant's needs.

Like Heidegger's hermeneutical treatment of Dasein's existential ontology, Winnicott has obviated the subject-object dichotomy in regards to the ontical structures of the self. The maternal holding environment is part of the very ontic structure of Dasein—it is constitutive of Dasein's Being. Failure in empathic attunement, mirroring, and optimal responsiveness is a deficient mode of Being-with,

thus a precondition of the false Dasein's inauthenticity. Within this context, freedom becomes abridged, thus affecting the true-self development *as it would have unfolded* if Dasein's ontological constitution of Being-with had been different. Winnicott supports this claim:

This compliance on the part of the infant is the earliest stage of the False Self, and belongs to the mother's inability to sense her infant's needs. (p. 145)

Under these circumstances, perhaps a false self is not false at all. The false structures are authentic ones, that is, they are constitutive of a true self, albeit a deficient self. Due to the historicity of various ontological contingencies that are themselves deficient modes of Being-in-the-world, as a structurally deficient Dasein, authenticity becomes curtailed by the demands of other Daseins *in* the very ontological structure of worldhood itself. In this sense, there is no pure or pristine authentic self distinct from Dasein's Being-with. However, Dasein's Being-with others and toward-onself will be greatly affected by the false structural elements of these deficient modes. Winnicott explains:

The infant gets seduced into compliance, and a compliant False Self reacts to environmental demands and the infant seems to accept them. Through this False Self the infant builds up a false set of relationships, and by means of introjections even attains a show of being real, so that the child may grow up to be just like mother, nurse, aunt, brother, or whoever at the time dominates the scene. (p. 146)

The nature of such defensive functions of the false self is constructed for one cardinal purpose, namely, "to hide and protect the True Self" (p. 142). "The False Self defends the True Self; the True Self is, however, acknowledged as a potential and is allowed a secret life" (p. 143). But what is the nature of this true or authentic self which is allowed a secret life? Winnicott does not offer an adequate explanation; he only points to the ability to enact spontaneous gestures of self-expression. Winnicott expounds:

The True Self appears as soon as there is any mental organization of the individual at all, and it means little more than the summation of sensori-motor aliveness. (p. 149)

Is this a sufficient understanding of authenticity? Doesn't the notion of authenticity carry with it, if not demand of it, that Dasein *can* to some degree transcend its mere thrownness? Clearly Dasein is other than its physiological contingencies. On one level, to be

authentic or true is to act in accord with one's genuine and congruent innate strivings and yearnings. Within the various psychoanalytic domains, authenticity may conform to the influence of instinctual drive determinants, ego mastery of the self and the environment, object relatedness and the pining for relational attachments, and the psychic need for mirroring and idealizing self-object experiences that form the rudimentary basis of a vital and cohesive self. Whatever the nature or *being* of these authentic strivings, Winnicott assumes they exist, are hidden, and are preserved unconsciously due to the character structure of defense.

Winnicott concludes that the false self takes on a role which appears to be "real," when in fact it is artificial. Indeed, this pseudo-real appearance takes on a "personal living through imitation," in which the child may "act a special role, that of the True Self *as it would be if it had had existence*" (p. 147). However, for Winnicott, the true self always exists behind the mask of the false persona, lying dormant, concealed, and protected. The false self, as defense, is "a defence against that which is unthinkable, the exploitation of the True Self, which would result in its annihilation" (p. 147). Thus, the etiology of the false self may be said to arise out of the deficient modes of other Daseins, which were foisted upon the child with various ontological and psychological exigencies to comply with or perish under. Therefore, it may be said, a false personality constellation is constructed in reaction to the fear of death of the self. Such fear of annihilation is the most archaic form of existential anxiety, a primordial denial of Dasein's Being-toward-death.

The unconscious displacement of the emerging false Dasein's annihilation anxiety is organized within the interpersonal matrix of the infant's earliest object relations. Within this context, Masterson (1981) defines the false self as "a collection of behaviors, thoughts and feelings that are motivated by the need to cling to the object" and thus suppress the longings for separateness and individuation (p. 101). Within contemporary object-relations theory, the false self functions defensively as a means to ward off separation anxiety and abandonment fears that ultimately represent the inability to integrate whole self-object representations, which in turn become the formative basis of a cohesive self. As a result, the capacity for spontaneity, autonomous self-assertion, and the expression of creativity are stymied and lost in falsehood.

Winnicott's developmental model anticipates Kohut's (1971, 1977, 1984) psychoanalytic self-psychology. For Kohut, the self is composed

of two poles, namely, (1) the pole of ambitions and strivings and (2) the pole of values and ideals. The former constitutes mirroring self-object experiences in which the authentic, core self is the center of initiative, self-assertion, autonomy, and vitality. The second pole is attained via the identification process and merger with the omnipotent, calming, infallible self-objects which are, in turn, internalized and become the intrapsychic structural foundation of the self. As Kohut theoretically moved away from the metapsychology of classical theory, the primacy of the self replaced the vicissitudes of the drives as "the center of our being from which all initiative springs and where all experience end" (Kohut, 1978, p. 95). The self, as the center of initiative and psychic motivation, depends upon the quality of self-object experiences for its structural integrity and cohesion. Within this context, a false self would develop out of repeated failure in empathic attunement and optimal responsiveness in the early self-object milieu. If the self becomes defined in the context of an other's narcissistic needs, capacities for self-soothing and self-esteem regulation are thwarted due to a depleted or fragmented self structure.

The false self can manifest itself in various modalities and in degrees of falseness. The more psychologically adjusted false-self organization may be represented by the overly compliant, obsequious, acquiescent, interpersonally polite attitudes that accompany the expectations of social convention. This may be similar to Dasein's everydayness as fallenness in the modes of idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity. As bad faith, one makes inauthentic choices which are situational, repetitious, or characterological in the service of avoiding one's responsibility to accept one's freedom. In other words, one characteristically chooses not to choose authentically and resides in the everyday mode of "the they," as the fallen *das Man*.

For contemporary psychoanalysis, Dasein's tendency toward fallenness serves primary motivations for relational attachment, emotional-interpersonal involvement, and validation of the self. In the case of the false Dasein, such wishes are inordinately intensified due to intrapsychic structural vulnerabilities of the self. Miller (1981) discusses a particular form of false development, that of individuals who are raised by narcissistic parents and are cajoled into being responsive and attuned to everyone else's needs at the expense of their own. Children who are treated as objects to meet the narcissistic fulfillments of their parents may develop a virtuous yet tragic gift, the gift of empathy. Throughout the drama of the gifted child, the false Dasein may develop skills of empathic attunement to

anticipate, respond to, and meet the wishes of others in order to gain love and attention; however, only at the steep price of sacrificing their true self.

Still more toward maladjustment, one could say the false self is the "actor" who puts on his theatrical facade but is unable to remove such a persona; he becomes over-identified in his role and loses his authenticity in oneness.<sup>9</sup> Under the rubric of such oneness, the individual seeks to make himself into a "thing," a Being-in-itself, rather than a Being-for-Self. Winnicott asserts, "Whereas a True Self feels real, the existence of a False Self results in a feeling unreal or a sense of futility" (p. 148). He continues: "The best example I can give is that of a middle-aged woman who had a very successful False Self but who had the feeling all her life that she had not started to exist" (p. 142). In the severe forms of the psychiatrically impaired, a false-self system consists of an organization of various part-selves, none of which is so fully developed as to have a comprehensive personality of its own. This clinical phenomenon is what Laing (1969) spoke of as the *divided self*. In a divided self, there is no single false self, rather only partially elaborated fragments which might constitute a personality. In the Daseinsanalytic tradition (see Kockelmans, 1978), for Laing, as well as for Ludwig Binswanger, Medard Boss, Karl Jaspers, and, more contemporarily, Rollo May, a false self develops out of ontological insecurity, thereby leading to an generally constricted Dasein. At the extreme, the self may experience a dissociation or a splitting of its embodied and unembodied aspects.

#### THE CALL OF CONSCIENCE

Up until now, we have delineated the ontological and psychological structures of the false Dasein as inauthenticity maintains itself in the throes of selfhood. By virtue of Dasein's ontological predisposition as Being-in-the-world, selfhood is subjected to inauthentic existential modalities already constitutive of its Being. Such disclosedness to worldhood is formatively installed in Dasein's constitution. Dasein's propensity toward fallenness is therefore necessary and unavoidable. However, if environmental conditions are such that Dasein's ordinary ontological structure is subject to more extreme forms of inauthenticity, the false development of the singular Dasein may not be eluded. The false Dasein results from interactions with pre-existing, deficient modes of Being-in-the-world which are thrust upon selfhood as its facticity. These false ontological structures lead to

further vulnerabilities that predispose Dasein to develop psychological deficiencies as well. Thus, the psychological attributes of the self are corporeally manifested in Dasein's ontology. Such intrapsychic and structural limitations of the self further contribute to Dasein's false existence and deficient modes of Being-in-the-world and Being-toward-Self.

Given these assumptions contextualized in the false Dasein, worldhood itself may be said to be a falsehood, plagued by bad faith and copious forms of psychopathology, and therefore inauthentic. Can Dasein transcend its predicament, or is it destined to live inauthentically? As Heidegger and Sartre would contend (albeit conceptualized differently), ultimately the self is free. However, freedom exists within the context of Dasein's ontological constitution. For Ricoeur (1965, 1966), Dasein exists primarily as fallenness in the sense that the will is enslaved by its actual conditions. In the case of the false self, Dasein is constricted by virtue of its ontological relation to a deficient environment, which thereby contributes to deficits in Dasein's psychological development. Assuming this is the case, does this false or deficient structure lead to another proclivity of Dasein to fall even further into inauthenticity? That is, if the environment into which one was hurled was ontologically inadequate to begin with, is not this bound to affect Dasein's future overall Being-in-the-world? Is not Dasein's Being-in and Being-with others and with-oneself greatly precluded from genuine authenticity, or at least the full possibility of such? And where do freedom and responsibility fit in for Dasein's future possibilities?

The false Dasein has no control whatsoever over its thrownness (as authenticity in the toils of inauthenticity). However, as Heidegger and Sartre would insist, Dasein has the capacity and responsibility to choose authentically, thereby actualizing its freedom to become and fulfill its possibilities. However, is this a correct assumption? Winnicott and Kohut underscore the point that one's true self, or authentic Dasein, may be structurally deficient, hence false. This structural deficiency is due not merely to Dasein's historicity, which may bring about self-deception, but also to developmental interactions that form the psychological basis of a cohesive self. That is, the very intrapsychic foundation of the self is in deficit and replete with tumultuous unconscious activity, thereby influencing the choices and the modes Dasein assumes in the pursuit of authenticity. Perhaps the false Dasein does not have these capacities that are more authentically developed in other Daseins, thereby encumbering the



ability to form genuine good-faith comportments characteristic of an authentic posture. Is it possible that the individual's intrapsychic structures are so deficient that the emergence of a false-character organization is not false at all, only deficient in comparison to other Daseins, whose ontological and developmental constitutions are less false? Is the false Dasein destined to make choices that are dynamically informed by such limitations? Are these structures set firmly in place as unwavering constitutional vulnerabilities, or is there an inner motivation, so that underdeveloped structures would resume their appropriate development if given the opportunity? And what would constitute this opportunity—a modification of Dasein's introspective capacities as recognizing and then actualizing its freedom within the context of its thrownness? Would this also require a modification from the social environment as well? Does the hidden true self strive for authentic expression despite its false structure, or is this false structure its very true or authentic mode to begin with?

If selfhood is abandoned to a falsehood that is already constitutive, a priori, of its Being, then the false Dasein will structurally exist (both ontologically and developmentally) in authenticity, but in deficient modes. In other words, Dasein's false structures are authentic ones, given Dasein's ontological contingencies that inform these deficient modes of Being. However, these constitutional deficiencies may lead the false Dasein to develop even further deficient modes of Being-in-the-world, including, at the extreme, psychopathology. The false Dasein is a real system; it is primary and true although it is stifled in its development. Due to these partially underdeveloped structures, it is unformed in its potential, thereby its internal states directly influence inauthentic modes of Being. Although the false Dasein is real, it is deficient and impedes more healthy aspects of the self from flourishing. Therefore, the *lie* or the falsehood is experienced as real albeit in the modes of the inauthentic.

At this point we must ask: To what degree does the false Dasein have responsibility to its authentic possibilities? Can the false Dasein overcome its fallenness and its psychological vulnerabilities as well? Can it alter its ontological and developmental status? Heidegger differentiates: "The Self of everyday Dasein is the *they-self*, which we distinguish from the *authentic Self*—that is, from the Self which has been taken hold of its own way" (p. 167). Can the false Dasein take hold of its true nature as transcendental possibility? Like Sartre's position of self-deception, Winnicott would maintain that the false

self hides the inner realities of the true self. In this interpretation, unlike Sartre's, the unconscious cannot be denied. These authentic strivings, wishes, and yearnings will always be allowed to have a secret life in the night-like abyss of the unconscious, and their disillusionments will be endured. But what resonates within the nocturnal pit of Dasein's core Being? Perhaps it is Dasein's transcendental authenticity as the "potentiality-for-Being which must be made free in one's *ownmost* Dasein alone" (p. 222).

For Heidegger, authenticity is ultimately self-relatedness (within world-relatedness) marked by the embracing of Dasein's responsibility toward genuine care. This care, in other words, is an ownership of Dasein's freedom that, in turn, opens a space for sublimated authenticity, which perennially exalts itself in its self-world relation. For Heidegger, this necessitates the "call of conscience," the voice of Dasein within Dasein that summons us to respond to an authentic appeal to transcend the corrupted public everydayness of Being and to call Dasein to a new possibility of Being. It is the voice of authentic Dasein's Being-toward authentic possibility. It summons me, it commands me toward myself. Such authentic relationship to our true possibilities of Being-toward-possibility must be born out of our own experience, clamoring for a higher unity of Being. Authentic Being-one's-Self requires an existentiell modification of the "they," in which "Dasein specifically brings itself back to itself from its lostness" (p. 312). Authentic Dasein must "make up" for not living and choosing genuinely and must first make possible its authentic potentiality-for-Being. Dasein comes to find itself through the disclosure of conscience as an inner voice. The receptivity of the voice calls Dasein to a "giving-to-understand" the authentic self, in which the call "passes over" the they-self and finds its true home in its enlightened understanding of itself. Heidegger explains.

One must keep in mind that when we designate the conscience as a "call," this call is an appeal to the they-self in its Self; as much an appeal, it summons the Self to its potentiality-for-Being-its-Self, and thus calls Dasein forth to its possibilities. (p. 319)

As conscience, Dasein calls itself; it is both the caller and the one being called. The voice of conscience has the character of an appeal "*summoning* to its ownmost Being-guilty" (p. 314). Such guilt, however, is not a moral or psychological guilt, but an indebted, beholden obligation Dasein has toward its responsibility to become and fulfill itself as Being-in-the-world. Dasein must seize upon such

guilt in that it "owes" something to itself and to others. It is the call of care, in which its lostness is recovered in its apprehension of its obligation to be *other-than* what it is in its everydayness. But what does the voice say? It says nothing. The content or substance of such call is empty; it is the inner voice without words, an appeal without authority, a summons without a notice, merely the "call of care." Thus, the call is the inner guidance of truth, an enlightenment that "points *forward* to Dasein's potentiality-for-Being" (p. 325). This call comes from the uncanniness it experiences in its guilt, which makes Dasein inextricably responsible for its own authentic becoming. Such uncanniness arouses a ubiquitous anxiety, directed towards its truth as "resoluteness." As a distinctive mode of Dasein's disclosedness, resoluteness is the truth of Dasein's authenticity as Being-one's-Self, as concern for Being-alongside what is ready-to-hand and the solicitous care of Being-with-others. As positive solicitude in Dasein's Being-with, authenticity is a special form of concern, that which is a "leap ahead" of the other, a genuine care that helps the other "become transparent to himself *in* his care and to become *free* for it" (p. 159). Equiprimordially, such transparency must apply to Dasein's Being-toward-itself as care.

On one level, the truly authentic Dasein is idiosyncratic, it is uniquely subjective and personal. Heidegger supports this position:

When the call gives us a potentiality-for-Being to understand, it does not give us one which is ideal and universal; it discloses it as that which has been currently individualized and which belongs to that particular Dasein. (p. 326)

Within this context, authenticity is a Being who contemplates itself, a Being who transforms itself. As authenticity, Dasein is care. Authenticity is Dasein's possibility *as such*; a fundamental relatedness of possibility-toward-becoming as an indeterminate openness to oneself. Authenticity is then, simply, *to be*, to be in selfhood that is a fundamental openness, rather than a self-enclosed, self-enslaved participation in everydayness. It is the relatedness of Being-toward-transcendence in its purist form.

But what are we to make of Heidegger's final determination of authenticity? One is left with a sense of generic ambiguity. Authenticity is opaque and equivocal. It follows a voice that does not speak, it points to a direction that is not visible, it summons us to respond to a calling we cannot identify; yet it appeals to an obligation that cannot be disowned. Perhaps authenticity is *beyond* what words can

define; only Dasein knows its truth. Is there such a clear-cut demarcation between authenticity and inauthenticity? I think not. Instead of these antipodes, we need to understand selfhood as a development on a continuum of authenticity, in a state of becoming as emerging freedom. How are we really to determine the criteria of what constitutes an authentic from an inauthentic Dasein, when these ontic-existential conditions are indissolubly determined in Dasein's own Being? If Dasein is its disclosedness, in that we disclose ourselves and then discover ourselves in our disclosing, then the false Dasein is only one mode of Being-in-the-world, capable of finding itself in its lostness and recovering its authenticity in its freedom. Therefore, the false Dasein is capable of hearing the call, understanding the message, responding to the subpoena by following the path of possibility, and transcending its thrownness in its Being-toward-becoming. The horizon of possibility is Dasein.

#### CONCLUSION

Throughout our quest for authenticity, we have seen how inauthenticity is maintained within an authentic falsehood ontologically constituted in Dasein's existential disclosedness. Despite the false Dasein's inauthentic comportment as Being-in-the-world, we have determined that it *is* indeed possible for Dasein to transcend its inauthenticity, even in the case of the false self, by apprehending its authentic Being-toward-possibility in its potentiality-for-Self. In other words, despite intrapsychic deficits characteristic of the psychodynamic interpretation of the false self, Dasein *can* ennoble itself in actualizing its freedom. Perhaps the interface between Heideggerian philosophy and psychoanalysis provides us with a clearer window into the possibilities for selfhood and gives us a more profound grasp of what it is to be.

In conclusion, I believe there is, for Dasein, a *double edge of centeredness*: namely, the authentic center of selfhood is one in the same, inseparable and modally undifferentiated, in that authenticity and inauthenticity exist in symbiosis as the core dialectical status of Dasein's Being. Dasein is beyond the authentic and the impure; a disclosure of such unification is its wholeness. In the phenomenon of falsehood, everydayness is a deficient mode, yet a necessary complement to the dialectical position of selfhood. In this sense, existence is neutral: it discloses the conditions not only for fallenness but also for transcendence as Dasein's emphatic destiny. The choice can only be Dasein's. As a temporal structure, authentic Dasein is a

*movement*, an incessant opening and closing of itself to itself, entering into the mode of the inauthentic only to discover its authenticity in such violent process. Indeed, this process is an authentic one, a constant movement on the continuum, sublimating and elevating itself in awareness, understanding, and action. Authenticity is therefore merely a moment, the indeterminate immediate. Bound within its temporal unfolding, authenticity is *Being-in-becoming* one's possibilities. As the possibility-for-Self, *authenticity is only one appearance among many appearances*. It emerges from itself and passes away back into itself, coming to be what it already is, the process of its own becoming. As an existentiell, the discovery or realization of one's inauthentic modes of Being necessitates, if not commands, a dialectical movement toward the fulfillment of one's authentic possibilities, in the endless search of the true self. This double edge is Dasein.

#### NOTES

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2. Heidegger's close friendship with the Swiss psychiatrist Medard Boss is well known. At Boss's invitation, Heidegger gave seminars to psychiatrists in Zurich for over than years on his existential-ontological treatment of Dasein and its theoretical applications to psychological practice. As the founder of Daseinsanalysis, Boss was instrumental in introducing Heideggerian philosophy to the mental-health profession in Europe, which eventually made its way into the American existential psychology movement in the 1950s and 1960s. From the published Heidegger seminars, Boss informs us that Heidegger expressed the hope that his thinking could break away from purely philosophical inquiry to benefit those in human suffering, including psychiatric populations. Cf. Medard Boss, *Martin Heidegger's Zollikon Seminars*, trans. Brian Kenny, in *Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry* 16 (1978-1979); William J. Richardson, "Heidegger among the Doctors," in *Reading Heidegger*, John Sallis (ed.) (1993), Bloomington: Indiana University Press; and Charles B. Guignon, "Authenticity, Moral Values, and Psychotherapy," in *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger*, Charles Guignon (Ed.) (1993), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
3. Cf. Erik Craig, "An Encounter with Medard Boss," *The Humanistic Psychologist*. Special Issue: Erik Craig (Ed.), *Psychotherapy for Freedom, The Daseinsanalytic Way in Psychology and Psychoanalysis* 16 (1988); and William J. Richardson, "Heidegger among the Doctors," in *Reading Heidegger*, John Sallis (Ed.) (1993), Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
4. Some may argue that psychology is not ontology and the conceptual link between the two is illegitimate. While Husserl tarried with ontologi-

cal psychology (see *Cartesian Meditations*, 1950, § 59), this was not a problem for Hegel, and I am proceeding with the assumption that our understanding of the human condition is grounded in a structural ontology. As comprehensively outlined in Hegel's *Science of Logic* (1812), thought is not even possible without such ontological contingencies, namely, the primordial ground of consciousness emerging to find itself as the coming to presence of pure subjectivity. Thus, reason is contingent on some prior form of consciousness that necessarily requires an underlying ontology. As Hegel carefully points out, without such an ontological ground, you could not even have thought, for subjectivity is the necessary condition that makes thought possible. However, I do not wish to equivocate the ontological-ontical terminology or treat it as though it is interchangeable. My aim is to proceed with a clear respect for the line between ontological/ontical and existential/existentiell. For Heidegger (1927), "*Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein's Being. Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological*" (p. 12). The ontic, that which concerns beings, and the ontological, that which concerns ways of Being, are differentiated by virtue of their apophantical and hermeneutical referents. Existential understanding, on the other hand, is an understanding of the ontological structures of existence, that is, what it is to be Dasein, while existentiell understanding is a person's self-understanding, that is, an understanding of his or her own way to be or what he or she is. While Heidegger does differentiate the ontological from the ontical, the ontical can only be possible vis-à-vis the ontological; thus our social and individual practices embody an ontology. See Hubert L. Dreyfus (1991), *Being-in-the-World* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), for a general commentary.

5. Cf. Charles Guignon, "Heidegger's 'Authenticity' Revisited," in *Review of Metaphysics*, 38 (1984), pp. 321-339, and "Authenticity, Moral Values, and Psychotherapy," in *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger*, Charles Guignon (Ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge: University Press, 1993), for a general review.
6. While Heidegger's and Sartre's existential ontologies are conceptually distinct with variegated subtleties, the question of authenticity is central to both of their philosophies. Albeit conceived differently from Heidegger's inauthentic Dasein, Sartre's notion of bad faith, as the renunciation of human freedom in the service of self-deception, contributes to our understanding of selfhood enthralled in the toils of inauthenticity, and further anticipates the psychodynamic exploration of the underlying defensive processes characteristic of the dynamic unconscious. While Heidegger offers a comprehensive hermeneutical treatment of Dasein in its relation to selfhood, Sartre depicts more acutely the psychological processes involved in the formation and maintenance of inauthenticity. While respecting the distinctions and divergences between Heidegger's and Sartre's ontological discourses, it becomes important to illuminate Dasein's falsehood in terms of its inauthentic ontical relations, which is the primary task of psychoanalysis. The equivocation of these different terminologies is therefore intended to facilitate the conceptual bridge between the existential-ontological structures of Dasein and their relation to the existentiell-ontical manifestations of inauthenticity that will be further addressed within a psychoanalytic account of selfhood.
7. Sartre's later notion of freedom stressed the "practico-inert," demarcating the scope of freedom as always being situated and determined within

- concrete historical, social, cultural, and economic limits. This parallels Heidegger's notion of thrownness. See *Search for a Method*, 1963.
8. Freud peripherally addresses the notion of the self in *On Narcissism: An Introduction*; however, the self is usually treated as the conscious portion of the ego within the classical literature. Freud himself explicitly equates the self (*das Selbst*) with the ego (*das Ich*) in Chapter I of *Civilization and Its Discontents*; however, the German *Ich* has been rendered by the words I, ego, and self throughout the psychoanalytic literature. (Cf. "Editor's Introduction," p. xxxiii, to *The Ego and the Id*, J. Strachey, ed., standard Edition.) It would be more accurate to say that the tripartite structure *itself* constitutes the self, for without the dynamic interplay among the three systems, there would be no mental life as Freud envisioned it, hence, no self.
  9. In Jung's analytical psychology, oneness is generally used to denote a mental construction of the self that is false. Within a Jungian context, oneness with one's persona would be an over-identification with the archetypal nature of the collective unconscious that is constricted. Following Jung's notion of the Principles of Equivalence and Entropy, oneness would be an over-emphasis and uncompensatory discharge of mental energy, hence unequally distributed within the psyche.

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